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Abstract
There has been a growing trend to utilize nonlinear models to analyze key issues in mon-
etary policy and international macroeconomics. Using traditional linear models to under-
stand nonlinear relationships can often lead to inaccurate inference and erroneous policy
recommendations. The three essays in this dissertation explore nonlinearity in the Federal
Reserve’s policy response as well as between a country’s inflation dynamics and integration
in the global economy. My aim in accounting for potential nonlinearity is to get a better
understanding of the policy makers’ opportunistic approach to monetary policy and evalu-
ate the inflation globalization hypothesis, which basically predicts that global factors will
eventually replace the domestic determinants of inflation.
In the first essay I develop a broad nonlinear Taylor rule framework, in conjunction with real-
time data, to examine the Fed’s policy response during the Great Moderation. My flexible
framework is also able to convincingly show that the Fed departed from the Taylor rule during
key periods in the Great Moderation as well as in the recent financial crisis. The second essay
uses a threshold methodology to investigate the importance of nonlinear effects in the analysis
of the inflation globalization hypothesis. Finally the third essay investigates the relationship
between inflation and globalization, under an open-economy Phillips Curve framework, for
a panel of OECD countries with a dynamic panel GMM methodology. Contrary to most
of the previous literature, which ignores such nonlinearities, my new approach provides
some interesting empirical evidence supportive of the effect globalization has on a country’s
inflation dynamics.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing trend to utilize nonlinear models to analyze key issues in mone-
tary policy and international macroeconomics. Using traditional linear models to understand
nonlinear relationships can often lead to inaccurate inference and erroneous policy recommen-
dations. The three essays in this dissertation explore nonlinearity in the Federal Reserve’s
policy response as well as between a country’s inflation dynamics and integration in the
global economy. My aim in accounting for potential nonlinearity is to get a better under-
standing of the policy makers’ opportunistic approach to monetary policy and evaluate the
inflation globalization hypothesis, which basically predicts that global factors will eventually
replace the domestic determinants of inflation. The validity of the inflation globalization
hypothesis could eventually lead to prominent changes in the conduct of monetary policy,
so it is imperative to identify the exact role global forces play in the inflation process.
In the first essay, A multiple threshold analysis of the Fed’s balancing act during the Great
Moderation, I develop a broad nonlinear Taylor rule framework, in conjunction with real-
time data, to examine the Fed’s policy response during the Great Moderation. My analysis
finds that standard two-regime smooth transition models are unable to fully capture the
Fed’s nonlinear response. I therefore utilize the Multiple Regime Smooth Transition model
(MRSTAR) to get a better understanding of the Fed’s asymmetric preferences and oppor-
tunistic conduct of monetary policy. With the MRSTAR model I am able to use both
inflation and the output gap as concurrent threshold variables in the Fed’s policy response
function and am able to determine that policy makers prioritize loss of output over infla-
tionary concerns. My flexible nonlinear framework is also able to convincingly show that the
Fed departed from the Taylor rule during key periods in the Great Moderation as well as in
the recent financial crisis.
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The second essay, Globalization and inflation: A threshold investigation, uses a threshold
methodology to investigate the importance of nonlinear effects in the analysis of the inflation
globalization hypothesis. Accounting for potential nonlinearities in the Phillips Curve, I
show that trade openness is not rejected as a threshold variable for the effects of domestic
and foreign slack on inflation in many advanced economies, and also find a switch of the
output gap slopes from one regime to the other that is consistent with the key predictions
of the inflation globalization hypothesis. For some countries the threshold Phillips Curve
model also leads to improvements in out-of-sample forecasts over the linear Phillips models,
especially at longer horizons. Contrary to most of the previous literature, which ignores such
nonlinearities, my new approach provides some interesting empirical evidence supportive of
the effect globalization has on a country’s inflation dynamics.
Finally the third essay, A dynamic panel threshold analysis of the inflation globalization
hypothesis, investigates the relationship between inflation and globalization, under an open-
economy Phillips Curve framework, for a panel of OECD countries with a dynamic panel
GMM methodology. Previous studies on the inflation globalization hypothesis have exam-
ined this question primarily at the individual-country level. However, a panel approach
seems quite appropriate as globalization measures, such as trade openness, often exhibit
considerable cross-sectional variation. Using this framework, I find strong evidence in favor
of including global factors, as captured by the foreign output gap, in a country’s inflation
process. I further augment the dynamic panel model with a threshold component and show
that trade openness acts as a threshold variable for the effects of domestic and foreign slack
on inflation. Importantly, the switch in the output gap slopes from one regime to the other
is consistent with the key predictions of the inflation globalization hypothesis, so that in
more open economies the foreign output gap replaces the domestic output gap as the key
determinant in the country’s domestic inflation process.
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2 Chapter 1
A multiple threshold analysis of the Fed’s balancing act during the Great
Moderation
Abstract
Empirical evidence has generally shown that the Fed follows close to a Taylor rule in setting
policy rates. This paper continues this line of inquiry by developing a broad nonlinear
Taylor rule framework, in conjunction with real-time data, to examine the Fed’s policy
response during the Great Moderation. Our analysis finds that standard two-regime smooth
transition models are unable to fully capture the Fed’s nonlinear response. Thus we utilize
the multiple-regime smooth transition model (MRSTAR) to get a better understanding of
the Fed’s asymmetric preferences and opportunistic conduct of monetary policy. With the
MRSTAR model we can use both inflation and the output gap as concurrent threshold
variables in the Fed’s policy response function and are able to determine that policy makers
prioritize loss of output over inflationary concerns. Our flexible nonlinear framework is also
able to convincingly show that the Fed departed from the Taylor rule during key periods in
the Great Moderation as well as in the recent financial crisis.
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2.1 Introduction
For over 20 years the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) has been used to both shape and evaluate
the central bank’s policy actions. An important feature of the rule was that it allowed the
nominal policy rate to respond to both inflation and the output gap, reflecting the twin
concerns of monetary authorities. While Taylor intended his rule to be normative, the fact
that it was also a good match with the Fed’s interest-rate setting behavior increased its
appeal as a tool to conduct historical policy analysis (Asso and Leeson, 2012).
Figure 1 plots the recommended rates from the Taylor rule alongside the historical Fed Funds
rate and we continue to see the Fed generally being close to the Taylor rule when setting
the policy rates. In the course of time, a few modifications have been further made to the
original Taylor rule to better fit the Fed’s policy response. First there is strong indication
that policy makers are forward-looking so that expectations of inflation and the output gap
play a greater role than current or lagged values in setting interest rates (Clarida et al.,
2000). An interest-rate smoothing term was also added because in practice the Fed prefers
to change its policy rate gradually to account for the uncertainty in its economic models
(Blinder and Reis, 2005). Moreover, a focus was put on looking at the real-time data that
is actually available to the policy makers at the time of their decision (Orphanides, 2001).
Finally, the possibility of the Fed’s policy rule being nonlinear has also been examined (Kim
et al., 2005 and Hayat and Mishra, 2010).
We continue this line of inquiry by developing a broad nonlinear Taylor rule framework to
examine the Fed’s policy response during the Great Moderation, an era in which the U.S.
economy experienced low output volatility and relatively mild inflation (Ahmed et al., 2004).
Purported changes in the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy and the role they played in the
4
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Figure 1: Actual Fed Funds rate and the rates under the classic Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993).
Great Moderation have been especially analyzed and debated.1 Boivin and Giannoni (2006)
show that the Fed, by being more responsive to inflation, was able to significantly reduce the
volatility of both U.S. output and inflation levels.2 Bernanke (2012) further contends that
the Fed also helped increase economic stability by reducing the potency of exogenous shocks.
Our goal then is to compare a broad set of non-linear reponse functions, in conjunction with
real-time data, to get a better understanding of how the Fed successfully balanced its dual-
mandate during this significant economic period. We can then determine if the improved
monetary performance was indeed driven by a greater emphasis on policy rules as suggested
by Taylor (2012). While it is understandable that much of the recent focus has been on
the Fed’s unconventional response following the financial crisis, historical analysis is still
valuable as long as we can clearly identify the policies in place when the times were good.
1See for example Favero and Rovelli (2003), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006),
Bianchi (2013) among many others.
2Stock and Watson (2003) determined that better monetary policy contributed up to 25%
of the decline in output volatility. Improved monetary policy was also seen as a key factor
in lower output volatility for the G7 countries (Summers, 2005).
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Our nonlinear analysis is based on the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) method-
ology (Teräsvirta, 1994), which provides a flexible framework to test whether the Fed has
asymmetric preferences and whether it conducts policy in an opportunistic manner. By al-
lowing for a smooth transition between regimes, the STAR models make it easier to identify
gradual policy changes and so have been a popular choice to capture nonlinear monetary
policy response functions. However one concern with the current empirical literature is the
reliance of only one threshold variable to generate the nonlinearity such as inflation as in
Martin and Milas, 2010 and Lamarche and Koustasy, 2012, output as in Alcidi et al. (2011)
and Kazanas et al. (2011) or some other macroeconomic variable like financial stress as
in Gnabo and Moccero (2013). Such a modelling approach forces one factor to be com-
pletely responsible for the observed nonlinearity in the policy response function. In order
to overcome this limitation, we also employ the Multiple Regime STAR (MRSTAR) model
as proposed by Dijk and Franses (1999) in our nonlinear analysis. Thus an important con-
tribution of our empirical strategy is that with the MRSTAR model both inflation and the
output gap are able to act as simultaneous thresholds in the Fed’s response function. With
four distinct regimes, the MRSTAR model is able to give a more complete overview of the
various economic scenarios and contingencies the Fed faces when setting the policy rate and
so represents a better tool for understanding key policy decisions.
Using the STAR methodology, we estimate Taylor rules with real-time data for the years
1983-2007. Our first nonlinear Taylor model has a Logistic STAR1 specification in which the
Fed’s forecast for the output gap acts as the threshold variable responsible for the regime
switch.3 In the Normal regime (output gap greater than −1.66%) the Fed’s response is in
line with the Taylor rule with an inflation coefficient greater than 1 and a positive output
gap coefficient. However, the Taylor rule fails to capture the drastic drop in the Fed Funds
3A monetary policy regime switch is said to occur only if there is a systematic change in
the policy response.
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Rate seen in the Distressed regime (output gap lower than −1.66%). Notably, the Distressed
regime corresponds to periods with strong economic shocks such as the Savings and Loans
crisis in 1987, the recession in the early 90s and the dot-com crash in the 2000. We then
estimate a Logistic STAR2 model in which the forecast of inflation acts as the threshold
variable. We find that while the Fed does have a strong response to inflation in the Outer
regime (inflation either below 1.6% or above 3.1%), it reacts only to the output gap in the
Inner regime (inflation between 1.6% and 3.1%). So we continue to see evidence of the
Fed being opportunistic in trying to achieve its inflation objective (Orphanides and Wilcox,
2002).
Extensive misspecification tests reveal that nonlinearity remains unmapped by these Logistic
STAR models. We then turn toward the MRSTAR model, which combines the separate
regimes of the LSTAR1 and LSTAR2 specifications and so allows the Fed to have a different
response in each of these economic regimes. We find that the Fed follows the Taylor rule
only in the Normal & Outer regime of the MRSTAR model. In the Normal & Inner regime
the Fed has a very passive response, while in the Distressed & Outer and Distressed & Inner
regime the Fed’s response to inflation is less than 1 and so in clear violation of the Taylor
Principle. These findings clearly show that the Fed did depart from the Taylor rule for key
periods in the Great Moderation. From these estimated responses we can also determine
that the Fed prioritizes a loss of output over inflationary concerns, and thus propose a loss
function that can account for such asymmetric preferences. Finally we also show that the
MRSTAR model can be used to examine the Fed’s response during the financial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on nonlinear
Taylor rules. Section 2.3 describes the real-time data sources. Section 2.4 gives the empirical
methodology and the Taylor rule specifications. Section 2.5 discusses the main findings while
Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Widespread policy failures in the 1970s pushed the Fed and other central banks to undergo
significant institutional reforms so that monetary policy could be conducted in a more sys-
tematic and transparent manner (Issing, 2008). Policy rules in this environment became
particularly attractive as a means to codify the decision making process (Poole, 1999). The
simplicity of the Taylor rule along with its emphasis on short-term interest rates enabled it
to quickly gain traction with central bankers (Kahn, 2012).
The classic Taylor rule can be expressed as
it = r∗ + pit + ζpi(pit − pi∗) + ζyyt (1)
where it stands for the policy rate in the period t, r∗ is the long run real equilibrium interest
rate, pit and pi∗ represent the current and target rates of inflation, and yt is the output gap.
Taylor suggested the value of 0.5 for both the response parameters while r∗ and pi∗ were set
at 2%. Notably the Taylor rule with these parameter values ensures that the central bank
changes the nominal interest rates by more than one-for-one to any deviations of inflation
from the target. This has been referred to as the Taylor Principle and is seen as a way for
central banks to keep inflation low and stable in the long run (Walsh, 2006).
Clarida et al. (2000) showed that a linear Taylor-type rule is in fact an optimal policy
response in a dynamic New Keynesian model with sticky prices. However, a key requirement
is for central banks to have a quadratic loss function so that they give equal weight to
positive and negative deviations of inflation and the output gap from their intended targets.
Policy observors considered this loss function unrealistic, leading them to an examination
of asymmetric preferences for policy makers. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) suggested
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a piecewise quadratic loss function such that policy makers have the standard quadratic
specification when the output gap is negative but focus only on inflation when the output
gap is positive (actual output greater than potential). A more general specification for such
a loss function is given in Bec et al. (2002) as
L(pit, yt) =
1
2
{
(pit − pi∗)2 + wey2t
}
I[yt>0] +
1
2
{
(pit − pi∗)2 + wry2t
}
I[yt<0] (2)
where I[.] is indicator function and we, wr are the positive relative weights to output stabi-
lization objective (so we = 0 in the original Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) loss function).
Loss functions that capture asymmetric preferences make it optimal for the central banks to
have a nonlinear response to existing economic conditions.4
Nonlinearity in the response function can also arise if policy makers try to take advantage
of underlying economic conditions to achieve policy goals. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002)
examine the possibility that policy makers are opportunistic and only respond to inflation
when it is outside some target range. So when inflation is within this range, policy makers
do not actively try to bring inflation toward the desired target and instead react only to
shocks that move inflation further away from the target. In such a setting the policy focuses
on output when inflation is moderate but moves toward price stability as inflation becomes
either too high or too low.5
A number of different strategies have been used to model the central bank’s nonlinear re-
sponse. A popular approach has been to allow policy makers to vary their response from one
4Dolado et al. (2004) and Surico (2007) find evidence of the Fed having asymmetric
preferences. Asymmetric preferences and nonlinear policy responses have also been observed
for the Bank of Canada (Komlan, 2013), the Bank of England (Brüggemann and Riedel,
2011) and the South African Reserve Bank (Baaziz et al., 2013) as well.
5Aksoy et al. (2006) find that an opportunistic policy rule is effective in achieving disin-
flation and at a much lower cost than standard linear rules.
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regime to another. If the regime switch depends on the value of some observed economic
variable, then we can apply threshold models such as the Threshold Autoregresive (TAR)
model or the STAR model. Alternatively the regime switch can occur due to an unobserved
state variable and modeled as a Markov Switching (MS) process (Bae et al., 2012). While
this approach requires fewer prior assumptions for the switch and so is more data driven,
it also makes it harder to infer the exact economic circumstances that are generating the
nonlinear response.6 Given that central banks often have clear policy objectives, it is highly
likely that shifts in the policy response are a direct reaction to observed changes in economic
conditions. The STAR model is also convenient for modelling gradual changes in responses
as policy makers are generally wary of abrupt policy changes as it can lead to higher volatil-
ity in financial markets and cause the public to lose confidence in the central bank’s ability
to manage the economy (Blinder and Reis, 2005). Thus in our analysis, we will employ the
STAR methodology to determine if the Fed’s monetary policy changed in response to key
macreconomic variables during the Great Moderation.7
A limitation with both TAR and STAR models is that they rely on only one threshold
variable to generate the nonlinearity. In the context of monetary policy analysis, this often
leads one economic factor to be completely responsible for the central bank’s nonlinear
response function. Indeed Kim et al. (2005) have shown that in the case of the Fed, the
nonlinearity is best captured when the interaction of the output gap and inflation is included
in the standard Taylor rule specification. Thus we also consider the more flexible MRSTAR
model and in doing so allow both inflation and the output gap to act as concurrent threshold
variables in the Fed’s response function.
6This is also an issue in the context of Time-Varying Parameter models that have been
also used to identify the central bank’s nonlinear response. See Boivin (2005) and Kim and
Nelson (2006) for examples of this empirical framework.
7Gregoriou and Kontonikas (2009) have also shown that the STAR model outperforms
the Markov Switching model in out-of-sample interest rate forecasts for key OECD countries.
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To our knowledge, Bunzel and Enders (2010) is the only other work that also allows both
inflation and the output gap to have nonlinear effects on the Fed’s policy response. However
there are three strong differences as it relates to the empirical analysis in this paper. First,
even when they consider both inflation and output gap as thresholds, it is still in the context
of a traditional two-regime model. Thus in their framework the Fed can only be policy active
if there is either a negative output gap or if inflation is above an interim target pi∗t (the average
inflation rate in the last two years) and so forces the same policy response in periods with
high inflation as in periods of recession.8 Second, their Taylor rule specifications are based
on the current horizon and so are unable to capture the forward-looking behavior of policy
makers as we do with our models using the Fed’s own real-time forecasts as inputs. Finally
they use the TAR framework in their analysis which, unlike the STAR models, is only able
to identify sharp changes in policy. Within the STAR framework we are also able to use
the non-linearity specification tests, as described in Dijk and Frances (1999), to explicitly
determine if the STAR model is adequate to capture the non-linear response. Such a feature
is missing in standard TAR analysis of monetary policy rules.
2.3 Data
The Great Moderation is generally considered to have begun sometime in the early to middle
’80s (Summers, 2005). Thus our analysis for this era is based on U.S. quarterly data for the
periods 1983:Q3 to 2007:Q4. We use 1983:Q3 as our starting range as it comes after the
sustained disinflation push that had been adopted by the Volcker Fed. Further, early in
the Volcker era there was a greater focus on monetary aggregates and so the Taylor rule
applied to such monetary regimes can often lead to misleading analysis (Sims and Zha,
8It is also a little unclear if the threshold values in these ’opportunistic’ Taylor rule models
are actually based on grid search estimates or are taken as ad hoc, yet reasonable conjecture
of when policy makers should be reacting to output and inflation.
11
2006). Ending at 2007:Q4 avoids the financial crisis, during which the Fed took a number
of unconventional monetary measures (Cecchetti, 2009) that can be difficult to analyze in a
Taylor rule framework.
In much of the early literature the empirical analysis on Taylor rules was done using expost
data that had generally undergone significant revisions. Orphanides (2001) contends that
it’s better to use the real-time data that was actually available to policy makers because
Taylor rule prescriptions can vary substantially depending on the type of data that is used
in the analysis. Thus we rely only on real-time data sources.
Our first source of real-time data comes from the Greenbooks that the Fed staff specifically
prepared for the FOMC meetings. The Greenbooks contain the Fed’s latest information on
previous output and inflation levels as well as projected forecasts for different time horizons.
In our analysis, we will be using primarily the GDP deflator as the measure of the price
level so that the forecasts of inflation are just the Greenbook-projected quarter-over-quarter
(annualized) changes in the GDP deflator. Since the policy rate is not revised we just use
the annualized effective Fed Funds rate series from the St. Louis Fed (FRED) database.9
We also use the data set at the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia as another source of real-time
data. Croushore and Stark (2001) have created data vintages for key macroeconomic series
where a vintage is defined as the data that is actually available in a particular quarter. Each
vintage incorporates revisions to earlier observations, so we can obtain the real-time values
of real GDP and the GDP deflator. A quadratic detrend is then applied on the real GDP
series to get the real-time output gap estimates for this data source.10 We will be using this
data as a robustness check for the Taylor rules estimated with the Greenbook forecasts.
9Unit root tests provided in Appendix A and little evidence of any non-stationary process.
10Note per Orphanides and Van Norden (2002), real-time output gaps constructed by
detrending are not reliable estimates of the actual output gap for a given period and so are
used only to gauge the pressures policy makers were facing in real-time.
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Figures 2 and 3 plot the output gap and inflation from the real-time data sources. To ease
comparison we also include the expost series using the most recent revised data available.
As can be seen the output gap forecast series from the Fed Greenbook (fgap) is closer to the
revised series (exgap) than the detrended real-time output series (rgap). Nevertheless the
forecasts of the output gap do diverge from the revised series notably in recessions and will
result in different estimates of the Taylor rule (Molodtsova et al., 2008).
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Figure 2: US output gap estimates based on either expost, real-time or Greenbook data.
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Figure 3: US inflation estimates (the year to year change in the GDP deflator)using either
expost, real-time or Greenbook data.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
An advantage of Greenbook forecast data is that forward-looking Taylor rules can be easily
estimated without any instrument variable.11 Since our nonlinear analyis is based on the
STAR model, we next give a brief overview of its modelling framework.12
2.4.1 STAR Methodology
The STAR model was developed as an extension of the traditional TAR models with the idea
that there was a smooth transition between regimes. This feature makes the STAR conve-
nient for modelling economic environments that undergo gradual changes. For a univariate
time series yt a STAR model can be specified as:
yt = θ
′
1xt (1−G(st; γ, c)) + θ
′
2xtG(st; γ, c) + εt (3)
where xt = (yt−1, ...yt−p, z1t, ...zkt) contains both lagged terms and other explanatory vari-
ables. The error term εt is a Martingale Difference Sequence with constant conditional
variance. The transition function G(.) is a continuous function that is bounded between 0
and 1 while st acts as the transition variable. So the STAR can be considered a regime-
switching model where regimes are represented by the extreme points of G(.) and there is a
smooth transition from one regime to the other.
The choice of the transition function G(.) plays an important role in determining the regime-
11These forecasts are assumed to be uncorrelated with current policy shocks (Boivin, 2006).
12This discussion borrows from Dijk et al. (2002) and Teräsvirta et al. (2010).
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switching behavior. The logistic function has been commonly used so that:
G(st; γ, c) =
{
1 + exp
[
−γ
n∏
k=1
(st − ck)
]}−1
(4)
with γ as the smoothness parameter, c1 ≤ c2... ≤ cn the threshold values that cause the
switch between the two regimes. When n = 1 we get the Logistic STAR1 (LSTAR1) model
and the two regimes are associated with small and large values of st relative to c1. When
n = 2 we get the Logistic STAR2 (LSTAR2) model with a regime switch when the transition
variable goes below c1or above c2. Finally we can have the Exponential STAR (ESTAR) case
where the exponential function is used as the transition function instead.
A key step in the STAR modelling framework is the hypothesis test of linearity against
the LSTAR and the ESTAR cases. The null in this case is θ1 = θ2 with γ and c being
unidentified nuisance parameters. In the context of STAR models a solution is to replace
G(.) with a suitable Taylor series approximation and then use a Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test to determine nonlinearity.
Estimation of the STAR models is generally performed by NLS, with one popular approach
being the concentration of the sum of squares function to reduce the estimation complexity.
If γ and c are held fixed, then the STAR model becomes linear in the parameters and can
be estimated by OLS. Sensible starting values for γ and c are obtained by a two-dimensional
grid search with γ usually made scale-free by dividing with the sample standard deviation of
st. The grid values for c are also usually restricted to be within a subset of st so that there
are enough observations in each regime.
To accommodate multiple regimes, Dijk and Franses (1999) also develop a Multiple-Regime
STAR (MRSTAR) model by encapsulating two LSTAR models and so is useful in modeling
more complex nonlinear process.
15
The MRSTAR model is expressed as:
yt =
[
θ
′
1xt (1−G1 (s1t; γ1, c1)) + θ
′
2xtG1 (s1t; γ1, c1)
]
[1−G2 (s2t; γ2, c2)] (5)
+
[
θ
′
3xt (1−G1 (s1t; γ1, c1)) + θ′4xtG1 (s1t; γ1, c1)
]
[G2 (s2t; γ2, c2)] + εt
where G1(.) and G2(.) are logistic functions varying between 0 and 1.
2.4.2 Taylor rule specifications
I. Forecast Taylor Rule:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(θ0 + θpiEtpit+k + θyEtyt+h) + εt (6)
We begin our empirical analysis by modifying (1) to get a forecast-based Taylor rule which
serves as our baseline linear specification. The inflation response is now given by θpi =(1+ζpi)
while the intercept is θ0 = r∗−ζpipi∗.13 We also as standard include an interest-rate smoothing
parameter in the linear Taylor rule. Rudebusch (2006) has raised the concern that the
smoothing preference found in estimated Taylor rules is often the result of the error term
being serially correlated. Mehra and Minton (2007) however, showed that the smoothing
term while smaller remained significant even after accounting for serial correlation. The
main explanatory variables, Etpit+k and Etyt+h, are the Fed’s respective forecasts of inflation
and the output gap with k = 1 (the one-quarter ahead inflation forecast) and h = 0 (within-
quarter output gap forecast). For longer horizons we also use k = 4 (average of the k =
1, 2, 3 and 4 forecasts).
13Convention is to take r∗ as constant (usually the average real interest rate) and use it
to determine the inflation target pi∗.
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II. LSTAR1 Taylor rule:
it ={[a1it−1 + (1− a1) (a0 + a2Etpit+4 + a3Etyt)] (1−G(.)) (7)
+ [B1it−1 + (1−B1) (B0 +B2Etpit+4 +B3Etyt)] (G(.))}+ εt
with G(.) = {1 + exp [−γ1 (st − c1)]}−1
Our nonlinear specifications are based on the forecast Taylor rule in (6). We first look at the
LSTAR1 case where the output gap forecast (st = Etyt) acts as the threshold variable. So
when Etyt > c1we have the Normal regime and when Etyt < c1 we get the Distressed regime.
III. LSTAR2 Taylor rule:
ft ={[a1it−1 + (1− a1) (a0 + a2Etpit+4 + a3Etyt)] (1−H(.)) (8)
+ [B1it−1 + (1−B1) (B0 +B2Etpit+4 +B3Etyt)] (H(.))}+ εt
with H(.) = {1 + exp [−γ2(st − c2)(st − c3)]}−1
The next case looks at the LSTAR2 where the inflation forecast (st = Etpit+4) serves as the
threshold variable. As in Taylor and Davradakis (2006), we prefer to take the threshold
variable as just inflation rather than inflation relative to some assumed policy target, which
simplifies the estimation and gives the Fed’s target range for inflation. The LSTAR2 model
also has two regimes: the Inner regime when c2 < Etpit+4 < c3, and the Outer regime when
either Etpit+4 < c2 or Etpit+4 > c3, with the Fed’s response in the outer regimes restricted
to be the same. Lamarche and Koustasy (2012) have shown that for forecast-based Taylor
rules a two-regime model cannot be rejected in favor of a three-regime model, with a different
response when Etpit+4 < c2 then when Etpit+4 > c3, and thus the LSTAR2 is appropriate for
the Fed’s nonlinear response.
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IV. MRSTAR Taylor rule:
it ={[a1it−1 + (1− a1) (a0 + a2Etpit+4 + a3Etyt)] (H(.)) (9)
+ [B1it−1 + (1−B1) (B0 +B2Etpit+4 +B3Etyt)] (1−H(.))} [G(.)]
+ {[p1it−1 + (1− p1) (p0 + p2Etpit+4 + p3Etyt)] (H(.))
+ [q1it−1 + (1− q1) (q0 + q2Etpit+4 + q3Etyt)] (1−H(.))} [1−G(.)] + εt
with G(.) and H(.) are as before
Finally we consider the MRSTAR specification where forecasts for both inflation and the
output gap are used as thresholds. The resulting model has four regimes by combining the
regimes of the LSTAR1 and LSTAR2 specifications. The MRSTAR model thus allows for a
more comprehensive policy response and should provide a better understanding of how the
Fed balances its dual objective of keeping prices stable and output close to the economy’s
long-run potential.
2.5 Key Findings
2.5.1 Linear Taylor rules
Table 1 gives the estimates of the linear Taylor rule during the Great Moderation. We first
estimate the forecast-based Taylor rule in (6) using two time horizons for expected inflation,
Etpit+1(one quarter ahead) and Etpit+4(one year ahead). Due to data limitations we are
able to only use Etyt (current-quarter output gap forecast) in these specifications. For both
horizons the coefficient for inflation is highly significant and positive (2.14 in specification
FT1 and 2.57 in FT2). A value greater than 1 shows that policy makers are following the
Taylor Principle by responding strongly to inflation. From the estimated θ0 in FT2, we
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determine that the Fed had an implicit inflation target of pi∗ = 2.49% during this period.14
Previous research has also shown that the Fed since the Volcker era has had an implicit
inflation target close to around 2.5% (Favero and Rovelli, 2003). Finally there is a view that
the Fed especially during the Greenspan years focused more on the core CPI rather than
the GDP deflator (Mehra and Minton, 2007). So FT3 uses the one-year-ahead forecast of
core CPI as the inflation variable, and we find little quantitative difference in the estimated
coefficients. Overall the FT2 specification gives the best fit in terms of the AIC and SBC
criteria, indicating that policy makers consider a longer time horizon in their decision making
process. This is in line with Amato and Laubach (1999) findings that a monetary policy
focused on targeting inflation over longer horizons has significantly lower welfare costs than
a policy that tries to stabilize current inflation.
We next augment (6) with the Fed’s forecast for the growth in real output. As in Orphanides
(2003), this is captured by the one-year-ahead output growth forecast relative to the potential
output. From Table 1 we observe that while the Fed has a positive response to the output
gap growth term in FGT, this variable is not significant at the10% level.15 We then examine
a Taylor rule that includes a proxy for the level of financial stress in the economy.
For the measure of financial stress, we consider both the IMF Financial Stress Index (FSI)
as well as the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s volatility index VXO. These indexes have
also been used in Martin and Milas (2012) and Gnabo and Moccero (2013) respectively.
Figure 4 shows these two measures are strongly corellated over this period. We see that
the Fed’s response has the correct negative sign but is highly insignificant in FST (see
similar results when the VXO index is used instead). Thus there is not much evidence of
the Fed actively responding to financial stress during the Great Moderation. Finally the
14pi∗ = r∗−θ0
ζpi
where r∗ = 2.85% (the average real Fed Funds rate over this period).
15We also consider specification: it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)(θ0+θpiEtpit+3+θ4yEt4yt+3+θyEtyt−1)
used in Orphanides (2003) and saw simillar results.
19
last column in Table 1 gives the estimates of (6) using expost values of inflation and output
gap. The coefficients are fairly similar to the forecast-based Taylor rules except for a much
larger output gap response, which is not surprising considering that output undergoes more
significant revisions over time.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
VXO
IMF FSI
Figure 4: Level of financial stress in the US as given by the IMF Finacial Stress and the
CBOE VXO indexes.
Table 2 provides several misspecification and diagnostic tests for the linear Taylor specifications
FT2, FGT and FST in Table 1. LM type tests as suggested in Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996)
are used to detect issues of nonlinearity and parameter constancy. The main candidates for
threshold variables are the forecasts of inflation (Etpit and Etpit+4) and the output gap (yt−1
and Etyt) along with the lagged Fed Funds rate as considered inQin and Enders 2008. We
also use our measures of financial stress as threshold variables since there is some evidence
that financial conditions can also lead to regime changes (Alcidi et al., 2011; Gnabo and
Moccero, 2013). The p-values from the F-test (preferred for small samples) indicate that
the assumption of linearity is indeed a strong restriction on the Fed’s policy response. The
strongest rejection, though, is seen from the Taylor rule variables and indicates their impor-
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tance in the Fed’s nonlinear response. We see mix evidence for the financial stress variables
with the IMF FSI but not the VXO index rejecting the null of linearity. Further the fore-
casts of inflation and output gap remain highly significant as threshold variables for FGT
and FST and so incorporating these additional explanatory variables is not enough to cap-
ture the Fed’s non-linear response. Finally the LM tests for parameter constancy (Lütkepohl
et al., 1999) show that there might be issues with stability as well.
Table 3 showed that both Etpit+4 and Etyt can serve as the threshold variable for the FT2
specification in the LSTAR framework. We then follow Teräsvirta (1994) and use his short
test sequence to identify the correct model specification (LSTAR1 versus LSTAR2/ESTAR).
The test sequence is given as H3 : B3 = 0, H2 : B2 = 0|B3 = 0 and H1 : B1 = 0|B2 = B3 = 0
done on the auxiliary regression.16 If H2 yields the strongest rejection, then the LSTAR2
or ESTAR model should be selected; otherwise the LSTAR1 is the more appropriate model.
Table 3 indicates that the LSTAR1 is the more suitable model when Etyt is taken as the
threshold variable. On the other hand, the LSTAR2 seems to be a better choice when Etpit+4
is taken as the threshold variable. So we have two distinct LSTAR specifications for the Fed’s
response depending on the choice of the threshold variable.
16This is simply yt = B
′
0xt +
∑3
j=1B
′
jxts
j
t + v∗twhere v∗t is the remainder term from the
third-order Taylor explansion.
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Table 1: Linear Taylor Rules Estimates. Sample period 1983-
2007 (quarterly observations). All coefficient estimates are the long
run responses as in Taylor (1993). CT uses expost data while all
remaining use forecasts from the Greenbook dataset.
Equation FT1 FT2 FT3 FGT FST CT
it−1 0.92∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant 0.02 -1.06 -1.83 -1.47 -1.55 -1.74
(2.39) (0.36) (1.44) (1.49) (1.41) (3.75)
Etyt 0.56 0.42∗∗ 0.40∗ 0.61∗ 0.49∗∗ 1.20∗∗
(0.39) (0.19) (0.20) (0.33) (0.22) (0.59)
Etpit 2.14∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(0.92) (1.51)
Etpit+4 2.57∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗ 2.74∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.63) (0.52)
Etpi
c
t+4 2.34∗∗∗
(0.45)
Et(yt+4 − yt) 0.77
(1.06)
Strt -0.13
(0.22)
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98
RMSE 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.50
AIC 1.52 1.39 1.42 1.40 1.41 1.49
SBC 1.62 1.50 1.53 1.54 1.54 1.59
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and serial correlation.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
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Table 2: P-values of misspecification tests
(a) LM test of no autocorrelation
Lags 4 6 8
FT2 0 0 0
FGT 0 0 0
FST 0 0 0
(b) LM test of no ARCH
Lags 4 6 8
FT2 0.01 0.16 0.44
FGT 0.03 0.19 0.49
FST 0.01 0.23 0.71
(c) LM tests of non-linearity
Variable it−1 yt−1 Etpit Etyt Etpit+4 Strt V XOt
FT2 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.01 0.12
FGT 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.04
FST 0 0 0.13 0 0 0.01 0.14
(d) LM tests of parameter constancy
Null: All coefficients constant All except intercept constant
LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3
FT2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FGT 0 0 0 0 0 0
FST 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: LSTAR specification tests
Transition Variable: Etpit+4 Etyt
Tests F-stat df p-value F-stat df p-value
H3 : β3 = 0 0.56 (3,85) 0.64 4.95 (3,85) 0
H2 : β2 = 0|β3 = 0 6.13 (6,86) 0 5.97 (6,86) 0
H1 : β1 = 0|β2 = β3 = 0 10.12 (3,91) 0 11.94 (3,91) 0
If p-value to H2 smallest, select LSTAR2. For all others select LSTAR1.
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2.5.2 LSTAR Taylor rules
Table 4 gives the estimates of the LSTAR1 version of the Taylor rule. A standard grid
search was used to get the initial values for γ1 and c1 in the NLS estimation of (7).17 From
this procedure we find that the output gap threshold c1 has an estimated value of −1.66%
and γ1is around 86. In the Normal regime (Etyt > −1.66%) we are in a relatively stable
period and observe that the coefficients for inflation and the output gap are positive and
significant (B2 = 1.81 and B3 = 0.72 respectively). So in the Normal regime the Fed is
simply following a standard Taylor rule. However, in the Distressed regime (Etyt < −1.66%)
the Fed’s estimated response is unsatisfactory under a Taylor rule as it does not respond to
the output gap (α3 actually has a negative sign) and inflation (α2 is not significant at the 5%
level). Using expost data, Kazanas et al. (2011) also find the Fed not reacting to the output
gap and inflation during recessions. Further we have a highly significant negative intercept
term (α0 = −4.0) that indicates a drastic drop during this regime.18
Figure 5 identifies the particular economic periods during the Greenspan era that correspond
to the Distressed regime in the LSTAR1 model. The regime seems to match well with the key
economic shocks of the period such as the Savings and Loans crisis, the early ’90s recession
and the 9/11 attacks along with the technology-sector fuelled stock market crash. Further
in Figures 6 we look at how the Fed Funds rate responded in the LSTAR1 regimes and
it becomes quite apparent that the Fed pursued an expansionary policy whenever it was
in the Distressed Regime. So based on these LSTAR1 estimates we can easily determine
that the Fed uses significant discretion when responding to economic shocks. Further this
17The grid search was run on the reduced form of (7) i.e ft = ϕxtG(.) + ωxt(1 − G(.))
where xt = [1, ft−1, yt, pit+4] for intervals 10 < γ1 < 1000 and −2.5 < c1 < 2.5 (5000 steps).
Long run responses with standard errors using the delta method.
18The estimated a0 is much lower than the predicted intercept value of −1.2 for a Taylor
rule with the inflation coefficent ζpi = 1.62 and the parameters r∗ = 2.85% and pi∗ = 2.5%.
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Table 4: LSTAR1 estimates
Constant it−1 Etyt Etpit+4 RMSE AIC SBC
Distressed
Regime
-4.00∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ -0.28 2.62∗ 0.41 1.13 1.34
(Etyt ≤ c1) (1.13) (0.08) (0.33) (0.68)
Normal Regime 0.77 0.65∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
(Etyt > c1) (0.46) (0.05) (0.11) (0.20)
γ1 = 86 c1 = −1.66
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and serial correlation in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
discretion took place during the supposedly Rules-Based Era (1985-2003) and so casts doubt
on Taylor’s (2012) view that Fed pursued an ad hoc monetary policy only after 2003. Indeed
Greenspan (2004) justifies this flexible approach:
As a result, risk management often involves significant judgment as we evalu-
ate the risks of different events and the probability that our actions will alter
those risks....prescriptions of formal rules can, in fact, serve as helpful adjuncts
to policy. But at crucial points, like those in our recent policy history (the stock
market crash of 1987, the crisis of 1997-1998 and the events that followed Septem-
ber 2001), simple rules will be inadequate as either descriptions or prescriptions
for policy....no simple rule could possibly describe the policy action to be taken
in every contingency.
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Figure 5: Regimes of the LSTAR1 model during the ’Great Moderation’. Output gap esti-
mates are from the Greenbook data. Economy in a Distressed regime if Etyt < −1.6%.
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Figure 6: Fed’s response in the Distressed and Normal regimes of the LSTAR1 model.
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We next turn to the LSTAR2 model in (8) with the estimated responses given in Table
5. Initial values for the two threshold values c2 and c3 along with γ2 are again obtained
using a grid search procedure and indicate the Fed’s lower and upper bounds for inflation at
piL = 1.6% and piU = 3.1%.19 Notably this (1.6, 3.1) interval encompasses the Fed’s implicit
point target of 2.5% that was found earlier with our linear Taylor rules. A target range for
inflation is often preferable as it gives the Fed greater latitude in conducting monetary policy.
Further, piU being closer to 2.5% suggests that the Fed has been more sensitive to inflation
that is above target levels. Figure 7 also shows that the Fed was quite successful in keeping
actual inflation (expost series) within this desired range during the Great Moderation.
When Etpit+4 is outside this target interval (Etpit+4 < 1.6 or Etpit+4 > 3.1) the Fed has
a strong and significant response to inflation with B3 = 2.49. On the other hand, the
response to the output gap is insignificant. Orphanides and Van Norden (2005) show a weak
relationship between future inflation and the real-time estimates of the current output gap.
The Fed seems cognizant of this fact with Etyt and Etpit+4 having a negative correlation of
-0.39 for the full sample and so it is not surprising to see a lack of response to the output
gap in this regime.
Figure 8 looks at the response on the Fed Funds rate in each of the two LSTAR2 regimes and
we can see the Fed in this Outer regime is motivated primarily by inflation and raised interest
rates to counter inflationary pressures in the economy. The Outer regime in 2002-2004 is a
result of inflation being below the Fed’s lower bound and so the decrease in interest rates
in this period is also consistent with a strong response to inflation. In the Inner regime,
Etpit+4 is within the Fed’s target interval and we see that the response to the output gap
increases (α3 = 0.78) and is highly significant. However, the Fed’s response to inflation drops
19The grid search was conducted on the reduced form of (8) with intervals 50 < γ2 < 500
and 1.0 < c2 < 2.0 and 2.5 < c3 < 3.5.
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(α2 = 1.94) and is no longer significant at the 5% level. Thus we can determine that the Fed
in the Inner regime is not actively trying to get inflation toward a point target, matching
previous findings in Martin and Milas (2010) and Lamarche and Koustasy (2012).
Table 5: LSTAR2 estimates
Constant it−1 Etyt Etpit+4 RMSE AIC SBC
Inner Regime 0.60 0.73∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.94∗ 0.43 1.22 1.43
(c2 ≤ Etpit ≤ c3) (0.25) (0.05) (0.15) (1.05)
Outer Regime -1.70 0.75∗∗∗ 0.01 2.49∗∗∗
(Etpit < c2 or >
c3)
(0.62) (0.08) (0.13) (0.24)
γ2 = 26 c2 = 1.6 c3 = 3.1
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and serial correlation in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
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Figure 8: Fed’s response in the Outer and Inner regimes of the LSTAR2 model. lnner regime
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In terms of goodness of fit, both the LSTAR models have lower AIC and SBC values than
their linear counterparts. The Relative Root Mean Square Errors (Rel. RMSE) for the two
LSTAR models with respect to FT2 come out to 0.86 and 0.90 respectively, further indicating
that the in-sample fit of the two LSTAR models is superior to the best fit linear Taylor rule
in Table 1.20
Table 6 gives the p-values for the LM tests of no remaining nonlinearity. The first of the
LM type tests is the standard test of no additive nonlinearity developed by Eitrheim and
Teräsvirta (1996). However, these LM tests check only for additive nonlinearity and so
may miss out on multiple regimes. So we need to test both the LSTAR models against an
MRSTAR alternative using the test developed in Dijk and Franses (1999). The results from
these LM tests indicate that we can safely reject the null that the LSTAR specification is
sufficient for this instance.
20See Brüggemann and Riedel (2011) for details on the Relative RMSE calculations.
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Table 6: Test for remaining nonlinearity in STAR models
Second Threshold LM test p-values MR test p-values
LSTAR1 Model Etpit+4 0.89 (0.50) 1.79 (0.04)
LSTAR2 Model Etyt 2.25 (0.01) 2.70 (0.00)
LM test is against additive STAR model and MR test is against the MRSTAR model.
2.5.3 MRSTAR Taylor rule
Before proceeding with the estimation of the MRSTAR model, we give an economic inter-
pretation for the regimes in this model. Figure 9 shows that there will be four distinct
regimes based on the value of the two threshold functions G(.) and H(.). The Normal &
Outer regime occurs when we have stable output (Etyt > c1) and inflation that is outside
the Fed’s preferred interval (Etpit+4 < c2 or > c3). In the Distressed & Outer regime we have
distressed levels of output (Etyt < c1) and inflation that is still outside the interval. In the
Distressed & Inner regime output is expected to be distressed and inflation still lies inside
the interval. Finally in the Normal & Inner regime the economy is expected to have stable
output levels and inflation will be inside the desired interval (c2 < Etpit+4 < c3).
Outer and Normal
Outer and Distress
Outer and Normal
Outer and Distress
Etπt+4
EtYt
Inner and Normal
Inner and Distress
c2c3
c1
Figure 9: Potential regimes in the MRSTAR model with both inflation and output gap
acting as thresholds.
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We again employ a grid search to obtain the initial values of the thresholds in the MRSTAR
model.21 The threshold estimates for the output gap comes out to c1 = 0.47% while the
respective thresholds for inflation are c2 = 1.45%, c3 = 3.10%. A concern in estimating
multiple regimes is that these models may be over-parameterized. However a preliminary
sample split, based on these thresholds, found that each regime of the MRSTAR Taylor rule
had at least 15-20 unique observations which mitigates some of these concerns. The inflation
thresholds in particular are close to the ones found for the LSTAR2 specification. We also
find a clear difference in the estimates of the smoothing parameters. In particular γ1 = 120,
which is the speed of transition between the Normal regime and the Distressed regime, is
much higher than γ2 = 10 which governs the transition between the Inner regime and the
Outer regime. So this suggests that the Fed is more willing to move from one policy regime
to another in response to shocks to output than inflation (γ1 > γ2).
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Figure 10: Using the estimated MRSTAR regimes to characterize the Fed’s response during
the Great Moderation.
21In order to speed convergence and reduce the computation burden, we reduced the range
for the thresholds in our five-dimensional grid search. See Appendix B for more details.
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Table 7: Corellation in the MSTAR regimes
(a) Normal & Inner Regime (b) Normal & Outer Regime
Etyt Etpit+4 Etyt Etpit+4
it -0.06 0.03 it 0.64 0.93
(c) Distressed & Inner Regime (d) Distressed & Outer Regime
Etyt Etpit+4 Etyt Etpit+4
it 0.95 0.75 it 0.83 0.79
In Figure 10 we use the threshold estimates to classify each sample observation into one
of the four MRSTAR regimes. We thus get a succinct overview of the different economic
circumstances the Fed faced during the Great Moderation as well as see the rationale for
some of its policy decisions. In Table 7 we also look at the correlation between the Fed
Funds rate and the Fed’s forecasts of inflation and the output gap in the MRSTAR regimes.
We observe that in the Normal & Inner regime there is very low correlation between these
variables and so supports the view of the Fed being passive in this regime. On the other
hand, we see high correlations between the policy rate and output gap forecasts in both of
the Distressed regimes. Finally inflation forecasts have a strong correlation with the policy
rate only in the Normal & Outer regime. These correlations thus give us some insight on
what the Fed’s main focus was in each of these regimes.
We next use the values of these thresholds and smoothing parameters from the grid search to
estimate (9) by NLS and get the Fed’s response in the MRSTAR regimes. Table 10 reports
these estimates. In the Normal & Outer regime, we see that the Fed has a very strong and
significant response to inflation with α2 = 2.17. However the Fed’s response to the output
gap is not significant even at the 10% level. This suggests that the Fed in this regime is
concerned only with inflation and tries to reduce inflationary pressures by raising policy
rates. The lack of response to the output gap in this regime provides support for Cukierman
and Gerlach (2003) and thier belief that policy makers are not interested in intentionally
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increasing positive output gaps.
When we move to the Distressed & Outer regime we see that the Fed takes a significant
departure from the Taylor rule. First the Fed has a very small and insignificant response
to the output gap (B3 = −0.06). More critically the Fed’s response to inflation, while
significant, drops to B2 = 0.80 and so is in clear conflict with the Taylor Principle (ζpi needs
to be greater than 1). A low response to inflation along with a significant negative intercept
term indicates that the Fed has an expansionary monetary stance in this particular regime.
The response in this regime is consistent with Alcidi et al. (2011) findings that the Fed’s
judgment during crisis periods played a substantial role in observed deviations from the
Taylor rule.
In the Distressed & Inner regime we continue to find the Fed having a relatively low response
to inflation with q2 = 0.86 and insignificant at the 5% level. On the other hand the response
to the output gap increases to q3 = 0.25 and is also highly significant. So it seems that
the Fed has a stronger response to the output gap once inflation gets within the desired
target range. Moreover, the weak response to inflation in both of the MRSTAR’s Distressed
regimes shows that during economic contractions the Fed is less concerned with inflation and
instead places a greater emphasis on output stabilization. Indeed the only time the Fed has
strong response to inflation in the MRSTAR model is when output is at the target level.
Lastly in the Normal & Inner regime we find an interesting response function in that the
Fed does not respond to either inflation or the output gap (both coefficients are insignificant
at the 10% level). Thus Fed policy is very passive in this regime which seems intuitive given
that both inflation and output levels are close to policy objectives and match the random
walk response seen in Lamarche and Koustasy (2012). However, the difference is that our
regime also accounts for the output being at a relatively normal level and so gives a much
stronger economic rationale for a passive policy response.
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Table 8: MRSTAR estimates
Constant it−1 Etyt Etpit+4
Normal & Outer -0.05 0.81∗ 1.43 2.17∗∗∗
(0.20) (1.41) (0.84) (0.56)
Distressed & Outer -0.67∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ -0.06 0.80∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.11) (0.03) (0.24)
Distressed & Inner -0.31 0.68∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗
(0.69) (0.06) (0.05) (0.36)
Normal & Inner -0.93 0.96∗∗∗ 0.21 0.45
(1.27) (0.11) (0.16) (0.31)
γ1 = 120 γ2 = 10
c1 = 0.47 c2 = 1.45 c3 = 3.10
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and serial correlation in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
We next make sure that the estimated MRSTAR model does not have any significant mis-
specification issues. Table 9 provides the results for these tests (see Appendix C for the
derivation of these misspecification tests). Auto-correlation become less of an issue for the
MRSTAR model while the LM tests provide evidence of coefficient stability. We also use
the parsimonious Ramsey RESET alternative to check for any remaining nonlinearity. The
RESET makes use of the linear combination of the powers of fitted values and so can be
used to detect issues of omitted variables and incorrect functional forms. P-values from the
RESET provide no evidence of any misspecification in our MRSTAR model. These tests in-
dicate that the MRSTAR model is a good fit for the Fed’s response and should be preferred
over the LSTAR models.
We now use our MRSTAR estimates in Table 8 to shed more light on the Fed’s loss function
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Table 9: P-values of misspecification tests for MRSTAR model
(a) LM test of no autocorrelation (b) LM test of no ARCH
Lags 4 6 8 Lags 4 6 8
0.02 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.71 0.57
(c) LM test of parameter constancy (d) RESET Nonlinearity test
Null: All parameters constant Null: λi = 0
LM1 LM2 LM3 i = 1 i = 1, 2 i = 1, 2, 3
0.00 0.29 0.06 0.65 0.23 0.39
RESET test uses the predicted values from the nonlinear model.
during this era.22 As in Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), we assume that the Fed is responding
optimally in each of the MRSTAR regimes. The distinct responses then seem to indicate a
loss function that is highly state-dependent, as suggested by Bec et al. (2002). Accordingly
we modify (2) and propose the following loss function:
L(pit, yt) =
{
(pit − pi∗)2
}
I[pit<c2;>c3] +
{
ryy
2
t
}
I[yt<c1] + ri(it − it−1)2 (10)
where I[.] is the indicator function and ry, ri are the relative weights. This loss function has
the additional feature that it penalizes the Fed only when inflation is outside some desired
interval (so capturing opportunistic monetary policy). Further having observed that the
Fed does not respond to positive output gaps once inflation is controlled for, losses from
output are only allowed to occur if the economy is in a distressed state. The Fed’s responses
indicate a strong preference for interest-rate smoothing across the MRSTAR regimes, and so
is incorporated in the loss function as well. Overall this loss function looks as a promising
candidate capable of generating the Fed’s observed responses in the MRSTAR regimes.
We test the robustness of our findings by using the real-time Philladelphia Fed economic
data set, as described in Section 2.3, in the estimation. In order to facilitate estimation with
22Note that there is no way to employ structural models with real-time data(Dennis, 2006).
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this data source and keep our empirical strategy intact we let k = 0, h = 0 in (6) and so is
no longer forward-looking. Taylor (1999) has argued that since they all incorporate the same
information, forecast-based rules are as forward-looking as those that use lagged values.
Table 10 provides the MRSTAR estimates for this particular data source. The estimated
threshold for the output gap is now slightly higher as c1 = 0.69% while the range for inflation
is much broader with c2 = 1.64% and c3 = 3.7%. In the Normal & Outer regime we see the
Fed following a standard Taylor rule with a significant response to the output gap (a2 = 0.21)
and inflation (α3 = 2.26). In the Distressed & Outer regime the Fed has a weak response to
inflation (B3 = 0.80) and so is not in compliance with the Taylor Principle. In the Distressed
& Inner regime the Fed only responds to the output gap as the response to inflation is not
significant at the 5% level. Finally the Fed does not respond in the Normal & Inner regime.
Table 10: MRSTAR estimates with alternate real-time data
Constant it−1 Etyt Etpit+4
Normal & Outer -0.40∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗
(0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
Distressed & Outer -0.62∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ -0.02 0.80∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.11) (0.89) (0.24)
Distressed & Inner 4.04 0.77∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.89∗
(1.96) (0.03) (0.05) (0.47)
Normal & Inner -0.39 0.97∗∗∗ 0.11 0.19∗
(0.32) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11)
γ1 = 213 γ2 = 33
c1 = 0.69 c2 = 1.39 c3 = 3.86
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and serial correlation in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
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2.5.4 Extension to the Financial Crisis
In order to examine the impact of financial crisis, we first extend the Greenbook data set
with the Fed’s forecasts of output gap and inflation for the crisis years of 2008 and 2009.
It seems reasonable in this analysis to focus on these two years given that the policy rate
reached the zero-bound at the end of 2009. We then use the latest Greenbook forecasts
along with the pre-crisis MRSTAR Taylor rule, using the estimates in Table 8, to predict the
interest rates in this period and compare them across the different regimes. Having models
with multiple regimes allow us to conduct this sort of counterfactual analysis and we can get
an interesting overview of how policy would have reacted in alternate regimes to the same
economic conditions.
Figure 11 looks at the interest rates that would have been implied in 2008 and 2009 if the
Fed had followed the baseline linear Taylor rule (FT2) versus if the Fed had followed the
MRSTAR Taylor rule. We can see from Figure 11 that the actual policy rates during this
period are much closer to the MRSTAR response in the Distressed & Inner regime than the
rates implied by the linear Taylor rule.23 Thus the nonlinear MRSTAR Taylor rule does a
better job in predicting the Fed’s actions during the early stages of the crisis. Further we
see that the MRSTAR model also predicts negative policy rates at the end of 2009. This is
in line with the challenges policy makers faced with the zero-lower bound during this period
and the subsequent development of unconventional monetary policies to combat the severity
of the recent recession.
We further conduct a counterfactual exercise to determine what the policy rates would have
been if the Fed’s response was consistent with the other regimes of the MRSTAR model. As
23The Fed’s forecasts of the state of the economy in these two years corresponded to the
Distressed & Inner regime of the MRSTAR model.
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shown in Figure 12, if the Fed had responded as if it was in the Inner & Normal regime then
the Fed Funds would not have seen much change during the financial crisis. Alternatively if
the Fed had responded as if it was in the Outer & Normal regime then it’s focus would have
remained on inflation and thus in the initial stages of the crisis it would have been unwilling
to reduce policy rates by a large amount. Once inflation subsided in 2009, we see a slight
drop in the predicted rates and so indicates that the Fed in this regime would only allow the
rates to fall if inflation was under control. Overall our analysis points out that the Fed under
these alternative regimes would have been less accomodative during the financial crisis and
as a result we could have had an even more severe economic downturn in this period.
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Figure 11: Implied Fed policy rates during the Financial Crisis using estimates of the Linear
Taylor rule and the MRSTAR response in the Distressed and Inner regime.
2.6 Conclusion
In the last three decades monetary policy has undergone a remarkable turnaround with
central banks now seen as a major source of economic stability. The Fed has been especially
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Figure 12: Counterfactual Fed policy rates during the Financial Crisis. Passive corresponds
to the Inner and Normal regime while Outer corresponds to the Outer and Normal regime
of the MRSTAR model
credited for successfully implementing a “fine-tuning” approach to monetary policy that has
kept inflation and the output gap close to their targets (Blinder and Reis, 2005). In this
paper we have tried to get a better understanding of the Fed’s policy response by using a
broad nonlinear framework with real-time data, two elements that are often been missing
from this literature.
Our results show that there is significant nonlinearity in the Fed’s response reflecting asym-
metric preferences toward both the output gap and inflation. By using a flexible MRSTAR
model we are able to estimate the Fed’s response in four distinct economic regimes and see
a much stronger response to a negative output gap and inflation that is outside the Fed’s
target interval. Notably the responses in some of these regimes do not fall under a Taylor
rule, suggesting that while the Fed prefers a systematic approach to monetary policy it also
employs considerable discretion in trying to achieve key policy objectives. We are also able
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to propose a state-dependent loss function that can generate such nonlinearities in the Fed’s
response function. Finally the MRSTAR model is also able to provide insight on the Fed’s
response during the financial crisis and we see that the sharp drop in policy rates is consistent
with one of regimes of the model.
An interesting opportuniy for future research is to examine the fit of the flexible MRSTAR
model to other central banks. We also do not need to restrict the thresholds to only the
traditional Taylor rule variables. So depending on the central bank’s policy mandate, factors
such as financial stress or exchange rate considerations (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007) can
be easily incorporated in the MRSTAR framework. It would certainly be quite notable if
inflation targeting central banks such as the Bank of Enagland and the European Central
Bank also reduce their emphasis on inflation during crisis periods. For, as we have shown,
there remains a great deal of validity for Mishkin (2007) view that successful monetary policy
will always have an element of art to go along with the science.
40
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Unit root tests
We test for stationarity by first using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test as given in
Said and Dickey (1984). Table 11 shows that the null of a unit root is rejected for all of our
main variables except the Greenbook forecasts of inflation (GB Inflation) and the real-time
Philladelphia Fed inflation series (RT Inflation). However it is known that the ADF test
has low power against relevant alternatives which can lead to misleading analysis. Thus we
supplement this test with the Ng-Perron test (Ng and Perron, 2001) which has better power
and less size distortions. For robustness we have also included the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski
et al., 1992) which tests for the null that the series is actually stationary. Overall these tests
indicate that we can treat our variables as stationary in the empirical analysis.
Table 11: Unit Root Tests
ADF test Ng-Perron test KPSS test
H0 : Series has unit root H0 : Series has unit root H0 : Series is stationary
t CV= −2.89 MZα CV= −8.10 Z∗ CV= 0.46
Fed Funds Rate -3.28 No -17.67 No 0.38 Yes
GB Inflation -1.47 Yes -9.04 No 0.35 Yes
GB Output Gap -3.79 No -8.40 No 0.36 Yes
RT Inflation -2.26 Yes -4.19 Yes 0.32 Yes
RT Output Gap -3.16 No -24.30 No 0.33 Yes
Lag length selected based on the modified AIC criteria. The KPSS Test is computed
with the Bartlett kernel and the Andrews automatic bandwidth selection. Critical values
given at the 5 percent level for all tests.
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2.7.2 Grid Search Procedure
We now detail the steps that we took to get the initial starting values for the smoothing and
threshold parameters (γ1, c1, γ2, c2, c3) in equation (5). Reminder that c1is the threshold for
the output gap forecast while c2 and c3 are the lower and upper thresholds for the inflation
forecast.
We started the grid search with the following intervals:−1.5 < c1 < 1.5, 1.25 < c2 < 1.75
and 2.5 < c1 < 3.5. These initial intervals for the thresholds are selected based on the
estimates of the LSTAR specifications. The smoothing parameters γ1and γ2 had an upper
bound of 1000 in these searches. Our first task is to narrow the range of c1 interval in the
grid search. We attempt this by keeping the rest of the intervals the same and only changing
the intervals for c1. The step size in these searches is 500 for c1, 100 for c2 and c3 and 50
for the smoothing parameters. Based on the R-square criteria, we find strong support that
c1lies in the interval (0.45, 0.50).
We next try to narrow the intervals of c2 and c3 by restricting c1 be in the (0.45, 0.50). interval
only. The step size in these grid searches is 50 for c1 and 500 for c2 and c3. Based on the R-
square criteria, c2 was found to be in the interval (1.35, 1.45) while c3 was found to be in the
(2.95, 3.05) interval. We then run a final grid search on these narrow intervals and were able
to determine the following initial values γ1 = 120, c1 = 0.47, γ2 = 10, c2 = 1.45, c3 = 3.10.
These values are then used to estimate (10) by NLS.
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2.7.3 MRSTAR Misspecification tests
Teravirta (1998) gives a detailed derivation of the misspecification test for the basic STAR
model. Starting with the general case:
yt =M(xt;ψ) + ut (11)
whereM is twice continuously differentiable with respect to the parameters and ut∼ iidN(0, σ2).
So when (11) is the LSTAR1 case we have:
M(xt;ψ) = φ
′
1xt + φ
′
2xtG(st; γ, c) (12)
where G(.) is given as the logistic function with k = 1 and ψ = (φ′1, φ
′
2, γ, c). An important
component of these LM tests is that we have to calculate the partial derivatives of the
log-likelihood function with respect to the parameters of the model ψ and so will be needing
∂M(xt;ψ)
∂ψ
=
(
∂M
∂φ
′
1
,
∂M
∂φ
′
2
,
∂M
∂γ
,
∂M
∂c
)′
=
(
x
′
t, x
′
tG(.), gγ(st), gc(st)
)′
(13)
Further it can be shown that
gγ(st) = G(.) {1−G(.)} (st − c)φ′2xt (14)
gc(st) = γG(.) {1−G(.)}φ′2xt (15)
We next employ a similar strategy for when (11) is given by the MRSTAR specification.
Note that the model in (9) can be reparametrized as:
M(.) = φ′1xt + φ
′
2xtG1(s1t; γ1, c1) + φ
′
3xtG2(s2t; γ2, c2, c3) + φ
′
4xtG1G2 (16)
43
So now we have ψ = (φ′1, φ
′
2, φ
′
3, φ
′
4, γ1, c1, γ2, c2, c3) and need the following partials
∂M(xt;ψ)
∂ψ =
(
x
′
t, x
′
tG1(.), x
′
tG2(.), x
′
tG1(.)G2(.), gγ1 , gc1, gγ2, gc2, gc3
)′
.
Solving for these partials for (16), we get
gγ1 = φ
′
2xt
∂G1(.)
∂γ1
+ φ′4xtG2(.)
∂G1(.)
∂γ1
= G1(.) {1−G1(.)} (s1t − c1)φ′2xt +G1(.)G2(.) {1−G1(.)} (s1t − c1)φ
′
4xt
gc1 = φ
′
2xt
∂G1(.)
∂c1
+ φ′4xtG2(.)
∂G1(.)
∂c1
= γ1G1(.) {1−G1(.)}φ′2xt + γ1G1(.)G2(.) {1−G1(.)}φ
′
4xt
gγ2 = φ
′
3xt
∂G2(.)
∂γ2
+ φ′4xtG1(.)
∂G2(.)
∂γ2
= G2 {1−G2} (s2t − c2)(s2t − c3)φ′3xt +G1G2 {1−G2} (s2t − c2)(s2t − c3)φ
′
4xt
gc2 = φ
′
3xt
∂G2(.)
∂c2
+ φ′4xtG1(.)
∂G2(.)
∂c2
= γ2G2(.) {1−G2(.)} (s2t − c3)φ′3xt + γ2G1(.)G2(.) {1−G2(.)} (s2t − c3)φ
′
4xt
gc3 = φ
′
3xt
∂G2(.)
∂c3
+ φ′4xtG1(.)
∂G2(.)
∂c3
= γ2G2(.) {1−G2(.)} (s2t − c2)φ′3xt + γ2G1(.)G2(.) {1−G2(.)} (s2t − c2)φ
′
4xt
With these partials in ∂M(xt;ψ)∂ψ we are now able to use the rest of Teräsvirta (1994) LM test
methodology for our MRSTAR model.
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3 Chapter 2
Globalization and Inflation: A Threshold Investigation
Abstract
We use a threshold methodology to investigate the importance of non-linear effects in the
analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis. Accounting for potential non-linearities in
the Phillips Curve, we show that trade openness is not rejected as a threshold variable for the
effects of domestic and foreign slack on inflation in many advanced economies, and we find
a switch of the output gap slopes from one regime to the other that is consistent with the
key predictions of the inflation globalization hypothesis. For some countries the threshold
Phillips Curve model also leads to improvements in out-of-sample forecast over the linear
Phillips models, especially at longer horizons. Contrary to most of the previous literature
which ignores such non-linearities, our new approach provides some interesting empirical
evidence supportive of the effect globalization has on a country’s inflation dynamics.
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3.1 Introduction
The view that highly interconnected markets will allow global factors to replace domestic
determinants of inflation, also known as the inflation globalization hypothesis, has recieved
a substantial level of attention, in part due to its significant policy implications. One of the
main predictions of the inflation globalization hypothesis is that the role of the foreign output
gap in the determination of domestic inflation will increase at the expense of the domestic
output gap as the country’s economic integration increases. This prediction typically has
been examined in the context of the Phillips Curve model; however, due to mixed empirical
findings, there is little consensus on the importance of the foreign output gap, and thus
globalization, in a country’s inflation process. Borio and Filardo (2007) show that including
a measure of foreign slack in a reduced Phillips Curve framework is appropriate for every
country in their sample. However, their findings have come under considerable skepticism
with Ihrig et al. (2010) illustrating that these results do not hold when a more traditional
approach to inflation expectations is employed in the empirical analysis. More recently,
Bianchi and Civelli (2015) show the importance of accounting for time variations in the
investigation of inflation dynamics, and they find that in a time-varying VAR framework the
impact of the foreign output gap on domestic inflation is positively related to trade openness.
In this paper, we continue this line of inquiry but depart from the standard framework by
explicitly allowing a country’s level of trade openness, used as a proxy for the degree of glob-
alization of a country, to have a non-linear role in the Phillips Curve.1 Our goal is to show
the existence and empirical relevance of a threshold effect of trade openness on the relation
between inflation and the domestic and foreign output gaps, such that inflation responds to
1Similarly, trade openness has been found to exert non-linear effects on growth rates.
See, for example, in this respect Cuaresma and Doppelhofer (2007), El Khoury and Savvides
(2006) and Papageorgiou (2002).
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external factors only after a country achieves a certain level of openness.2 A number of eco-
nomic factors can motivate this type of non-linear behavior. For instance, Sbordone (2007)
shows that one of the ways globalization can affect the structural determinants of inflation is
by reducing the market power of domestic sellers through increased competition; however, it
may be the case that domestic companies start to pay attention to foreign competitors only
after they have captured a significant market share. This non-linearity should not be omitted
from the analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis, and exploring it in a systematic
manner could lead to greater insight on the relationship between inflation and openness and
assist policy makers to better deal with some of the challenges of globalization.
Applying Hansen’s (1997; 2000) threshold methodology, we are able to examine the non-
linear effects of openness on inflation at the individual-country level for a sample of 16
OECD economies. Considering possible threshold effects of trade openness in a Phillips
Curve framework is a simple way to assess directly the effects of globalization on inflation.
We follow a two-stage empirical strategy to document some interesting new evidence in favor
of the use of the threshold approach in evaluating the inflation globalization hypothesis.
In the first stage of the analysis, we identify the countries for which the non-linearity is
statistically meaningful. It is quite possible that some countries just do not reach a level of
openness to experience a shift in their inflation dynamics. In such instances the threshold
methodology does not give us any additional insight in the relationship between inflation
and globalization. In the second stage of the analysis, we examine the countries that do
pass the test for a significant threshold and determine whether the switch of the output gap
slopes from one regime to the other is consistent with the key predictions of the inflation
globalization hypothesis.
2Most of the empirical evidence against the inflation globalization hypothesis ignores
potential non-linearities that might affect inflation dynamics.
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The results show that for most of our sample countries the level of trade openness is a
statistically significant threshold variable for the analysis of the effects of domestic and
foreign slack on inflation. In the first stage, we find that openness is not a meaningful
threshold in our preferred specification of the Phillips Curve for only four countries; these
are typically the economies with the lowest degrees of openness, like the U.S. or Japan. In the
second stage, we find a broad support of the inflation globalization hypothesis from all the
remaining countries after accounting for the non-linear relationship. For half the countries
the estimated output gap responses in the two regimes are consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the hypothesis. For the other half we find a switch of the coefficient of either
foreign or domestic gap that is in line with the hypothesis. Finally, we also find interesting
variation in the estimated thresholds across countries, which reflects the structural differences
embedded in the level of openness across economies.
Our baseline non-linear model is deliberately simple. For robustness we conduct a number
of checks for this choice of specification. In particular, we find no significant impact from
allowing inflation to have a downward trend; we also find that our main results are robust
to the use of different definitions of inflation and to the inclusion of oil prices, real exchange
rates, and import prices as additional controls. Finally, we assess the out-of-sample forecast
performance of our model in comparison to its linear alternatives, finding an improvement
in the forecast fit for some of the countries, especially at longer horizons.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related litera-
ture. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively describe our data and the linear Phillips Curve results
for our sample of countries. In Section 3.4.2, we move to the threshold analysis and examine
the role of openness in a country’s inflation dynamics. Section 3.4.3 illustrates the robustness
checks to the baseline specification of the model. Finally, in Section 3.5 we examine some of
the policy implications of our results and conclude.
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3.2 Related Literature
The traditional approach in modeling inflation dynamics has been to focus on country-specific
factors, such as domestic output, while leaving a limited role for external factors that were
usually captured in the form of supply shocks. However, the increased level of globalization
that has taken place through higher levels of trade, financial integration, and movement
across factor markets might have changed the very nature of the inflation process. It may
now very well be the case that a country’s prices are more influenced by events happening
in the global rather than the domestic markets.
A theoretical justification to focus on external factors in the inflation process is also provided
by Gali and Monacelli (2005), who extend the micro-founded New Keynesian Phillips Curve
to the open-economy case. Their key insight is that inflation depends on the weighted average
of the domestic and foreign output gaps, where the weights represent some preference for
home goods. The inclusion of the foreign output gap in the Phillips Curve shows that along
with the direct effects of trade, such as import prices or real exchange rates, there is also a
need for some measure of excess global demand, since low demand in one country could be
countered by high demand in another.3 Similarly, Engel (2013) investigates how the Phillips
Curve for the consumer price inflation in a country is affected by openness. He compares a
model that assumes producer currency pricing with one under local currency pricing, within
a theoretical framework in which domestic inflation is directly affected by the global economy
through the foreign output gap and imported-goods inflation. He shows that the exchange
rate affects inflation not only in the producer currency pricing model due to perfect pass-
through, but also in the local currency pricing model through the movements of the term of
trade due to a wealth redistribution across countries. We rely on this strand of the theoretical
3In the extreme, as pointed out by Borio and Filardo (2007), this implies that excess
demand should be aggregated at the product rather than the country level.
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literature to justify our empirical approach and to gain a better understanding of the overall
relationship between globalization and inflation.
A number of studies have used the open-economy Phillips Curve framework to investigate
the inflation globalization hypothesis. The empirical evidence, however, is still quite am-
biguous as seen by the contrasting findings of Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al.
(2010). Gamber and Hung (2001) show that globalization increased the sensitivity of U.S.
inflation to foreign economic conditions in the ’90s. For a group of advanced economies,
the IMF (2006) and Pain et al. (2006) also find a reduction in sensitivity of inflation to
domestic capacity constraints due to increased globalization, although in the latter case this
is primarily captured through the import channel. On the other hand, Calza (2009) finds
that globalization in the form of global output gaps has little success in explaining domestic
inflation for the Euro area as a whole. Using a structural model for the G7 countries, Milani
(2010) also determines that global output impacts domestic inflation indirectly, and thus
it should not be included in the Phillips Curve specification. Finally, in a New Keynesian
framework, Sbordone (2007) provides an analytical justification for the diminishing sensi-
tivity of inflation to domestic output fluctuations in response to increased globalization and
reduced market power of domestic producers.
3.3 Data Description
The data for our empirical analysis comes from Bianchi and Civelli (2015) and consists of
quarterly observations from 1985 to 2006 for a panel of 16 OECD countries: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and the U.S. For each country, the dataset for the baseline
specification of the non-linear model includes domestic inflation measured by the Consumer
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Price Index, the domestic and foreign output gaps, a measure of trade openness, and the
effective real exchange rate.
The foreign output gap and the real exchange rate are respectively constructed as trade-
weighted averages of the domestic output gaps and pairwise exchange rates of the country’s
trade partners. The weights are obtained starting from the series of the pairwise import
and export flows among a set of about 50 countries which, besides the 16 countries in
our sample, includes all the OECD countries, the major Asian economies, and some other
emerging countries. The weights are computed following the approach used by the Federal
Reserve Board in the construction of its effective real exchange rate. The weights are meant
to measure the relative importance of an international partner for a country. This is achieved
accounting both for the direct relations between two countries, given by the relative share of
imports and exports from one country to the other, and for the so-called third-party relations,
which are used to take into account the indirect effects due to international competition
among countries.4,5
The domestic output gap of a country is constructed as the percentage deviation from the
HP-filtered real GDP series taken as a proxy for the potential GDP. The source for the real
GDP is the OECD National Account Statistics or the IMF. For each of the 16 countries in
our non-linear analysis the domestic output gaps of all the other countries are then weighted
to form the trade-based measure of the foreign gap. The foreign output gap is then specific
to each country. The same procedure applies to the construction of the country-specific
4The formulas for the imports, wm, exports, wx, and third-party weights, w3, are:
wm
i,j,t
= Mi,j,t∑Nt
j=1Mi,j,t
; wxi,j,t =
EXi,j,t∑Nt
j=1EXi,j,t
; w3
i,j,t
=
Nt∑
k Ó=j,Ó=i
wx
i,k,t
wmk,j,t
1− wm
k,i,t
where Mi,j is import from country j to country i, EXi,j export from country i to country
j.
5The trade flows data come from the IMF-DOT database. See Bianchi and Civelli (2015)
for more details and the list of countries used in the trade-weights sample.
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real exchange rates. The pairwise nominal exchange rates, generally obtained from Global
Insight, are deflated by the CPI of the respective country, and aggregated using the same
trade-based weights.
Trade openness is defined as the ratio to GDP of the sum of imports and exports of a
country. Following Borio and Filardo (2007) and Bianchi and Civelli (2015), the inflation
rate is computed as the log-difference of the domestic CPI index relative to the same quarter
of the previous year. The CPI values usually come from the IMF or OECD Main Economic
Indicators (MEI) datasets, with base year set to 2000. Finally, for the robustness exercises
we obtain data for core inflation using CPI (excluding all food and energy prices) from
the OECD MEI while the import price deflator and global oil prices are from the OECD
Economic Outlook dataset.
Table 1 sorts these countries based on their average level of openness. We see that there
is significant variation, ranging from relatively closed countries such as the U.S. and Japan
with levels of openness close to 20% of GDP to more open economies such as the Netherlands
and Ireland with levels of openness close to 100% of GDP. Given these strong differences it
would not be surprising if openness affected these countries asymmetrically.
In our analysis, we focus only on observations from 1985 onward to account for the structural
break in inflation that was seen for most advanced economies in the early ′80s (Rapach
and Wohar, 2005). Since this decrease in inflation rates was a result of more aggressive
central bank actions, it would be inappropriate to link it solely with increased globalization
(Calza, 2009). Thus we adopt a conservative approach and avoid the earlier periods, even
though these were also years that experienced relatively steady growth in international trade.
Finally, ending the sample in 2006 allows us to compare our results directly with earlier
literature, while also avoiding the impact of the global financial crisis and the subsequent
decline in international trade (Wynne and Kersting, 2009).
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Table 1: OECD data (1985-2006)
Country Code Open Inf
US US 0.170 3.01
Japan JPN 0.176 0.68
Australia AUS 0.296 3.86
Spain SPN 0.333 4.42
Italy ITA 0.353 3.95
France FRA 0.388 2.23
UK UK 0.400 3.63
Mexico MEX 0.401 23.0
Germany GER 0.472 1.83
Denmark DEN 0.528 2.57
Korea KOR 0.564 4.41
Canada CAN 0.565 2.68
Switzerland SWZ 0.568 1.83
Austria AUT 0.654 2.19
Netherlands NET 0.903 2.05
Ireland IRE 1.032 3.08
Quarterly averages, sorted by the
country’s average level of openness.
3.4 Phillips Curve Analysis
3.4.1 Linear Results
We begin with a linear Phillips Curve model that lays the groundwork for the non-linear
analysis in Section 3.4.2. To analyze the effect of globalization on domestic inflation, we
employ an open-economy version of the Phillips Curve so that the foreign output gap is
added to the baseline empirical specification and obtain a set of standard results for our 16
OECD countries. The linear model can be expressed in general form as
pit = α +
L∑
k=1
ρkpit−k + βY dt + γY
f
t + εt (1)
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where inflation, pit, is related to its L lagged realizations and the contemporaneous domestic
and foreign output gaps, Y dt and Y
f
t respectively. While this purely backward-looking spec-
ification may lack some of the structural interpretation of an explicit forward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (Gali and Monacelli, 2005), it still provides a suitable reduced-
form analysis of inflation dynamics. Furthermore, there is also some strong evidence that
the backward-looking model is a better empirical fit (Rudd and Whelan, 2007) and more
structurally stable (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003) than pure forward-looking models. Using this
same specification, Ihrig et al. (2010) show that the foreign output gap is not statistically
significant for any country in their sample.6
Table 4 illustrates the estimates of a specification of model (1) in which we include one
lagged value of inflation and the average of the subsequent four lags for the 16 countries in
our sample. Our results are broadly consistent with those in Ihrig et al. (2010) (see their
Table 1), with most of the countries showing very little role for the foreign output gap. As
in Ihrig et al. (2010), the foreign output gap coefficient is often negative and nearly always
insignificant. The only exception is Ireland, which, being a very open economy, sees an impact
from the foreign output gap on its inflation significant at 10%. This is an interesting result
because Ireland is the most open country in our analysis, based on the trade index adopted
here, with a level of openness about two times the average. Table 4 shows that the domestic
output gap is also insignificant for most of the countries, a recurrent finding in open-economy
Phillips Curves.7 Finally, the LM tests for serial autocorrelation and hetroskedasticity along
with the RESET tests indicate that equation (1) is properly specified.8
6Ihrig et al. (2010) also employ a variety of controls for supply shocks such as energy and
food prices as well as tax dummies, but these did not impact their main results.
7Indeed, the domestic output gap gains significance when we exclude the foreign output
gap from the estimation.
8We also estimate (1) using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework as in IMF
(2006), allowing for common shocks. The results reported in Table A1 are quite similar.
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3.4.2 Threshold Results
Based just on the linear estimates in Table 4 one may conclude that, save for Ireland, the
inflation process in all other countries has not been greatly influenced by globalization,
and that policy makers should continue to focus on the domestic determinants of inflation.
However, as has been pointed out by Bianchi and Civelli (2015), a simple linear Phillips
Curve model is insufficient to assess satisfactorily the inflation globalization hypothesis. The
evolution of globalization needs to be explicitly embedded in the analysis, allowing for the
possibility of both non-linearity and heterogeneity across countries and thus allowing us to
gain a better understanding of this complex relation.
One simple and effective way to allow for non-linear effects of globalization on inflation is to
modify the Phillips Curve model in (1) as a threshold model. The Threshold Phillips Curve
is then given as
pit = α +
L∑
k=1
ρkpit−k +

β1Y
d
t + γ1Y
f
t + εt when Openness ≤ θ0
β2Y
d
t + γ2Y
f
t + εt when Openness > θ0
(2)
where trade openness acts as the threshold variable and is responsible for the switch in the
relation between inflation and the output gaps from one regime to another.
Globalization can be measured over several dimensions besides trade openness; we choose
to use trade openness mainly for two reasons. First, trade openness has often been used as
a proxy for the degree of globalization of a country in empirical work, and it is especially
relevant for our purposes since inflation in an open-economy Phillips Curve framework is
directly affected by external factors through the trade channel. Second, as illustrated for
instance by Engel (2013), in the theoretical open-economy models of the New Keynesian
60
Phillips Curve not only is domestic inflation is affected by the foreign output gap and move-
ments in the exchange rates, but also the importance of these international factors increases
as trade openness increases.
An important caveat to bear in mind about our approach is that trade might not fully capture
the full complexity of the globalization process. Clearly, a limitation of our approach is that
using trade openness as a threshold variable and trade-based weights for the construction
of the relevant foreign output gap of a country might be not be exhaustive if other aspects
of globalization are relevant for the dynamic of domestic prices. A couple of other channels
come to mind. First, integration of financial markets plays an important role in wealth
distribution across countries and, hence, international consumption sharing. So the degree
of financial globalization could also affect domestic prices through the foreign output gap.
Second, when domestic markets are contestable, the influence of higher globalization on
domestic prices could manifest itself through the effects of a stronger threat of entry by new
international competitors that lowers domestic prices; this channel, for example, would be
independent of trade per se.
Based also on these theoretical insights, we opt for a deliberately simple specification for our
baseline non-linear model in (2), in which we allow openness to influence only the slopes of
the gaps, while the lagged inflation terms and the intercept are the same in each regime.
In our analysis we found that possible non-linear effects on the autoregressive component
were quite modest with most countries seeing relatively few gains in the in-sample fit from
allowing the lag coefficients to switch as well.9 Bick (2010) has also shown that regime
9To isolate possible non-linearities in the autoregressive component of the inflation equa-
tion, we also estimate a non-linear model that keeps the coefficients of the two output
gaps fixed instead and find that for the overwhelming majority of our sample countries the
Hansen(1997) F-test rejects a switch in the lag coefficients due to openness. This is not
surprising as generally central bank policies are considered to be the main factor that drives
shifts in the formation of inflation expectations (Bianchi, 2013).
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intercepts can often play a significant role in threshold analysis and so in Section 3.4.3, we
allow the constant term to change between regimes. In this stage of our analysis we also do
not include other factors, such as import prices or the real exchange rate, as we prefer to
solely focus on the predictions of the globalization hypothesis on the output gap coefficients.
In Section 3.4.3 we see that the baseline results are generally robust when these factors
are added as control variables. Overall, our preferred model in (2) is a very simple way
to incorporate potential non-linearities that allow the foreign output gap to matter for the
inflation process only for certain levels of openness.
We follow Hansen (1997, 2000) to both estimate and test our threshold models. A consistent
estimate of θ0 is one that minimizes the residual variance of (2) and can be found by a
grid search over all the possible values of the threshold variable. For a given θ0, the rest of
the model becomes linear in the parameters and can be then estimated by OLS. θ0 is also a
nuisance parameter in standard F or LM tests that check for the significance of the threshold
model by testing the null hypothesis H0 : β1 = β2, γ1 = γ2. Thus, as in Hansen (1997), we
apply a bootstrap method to approximate the distribution of the test statistics under the
null, and then use it to obtain the corresponding bootstrapped p-values for these tests.
Our empirical strategy will proceeds in two stages. First, we analyze the thresholds to
identify the countries for which the non-linearity in the relation is actually statistically
meaningful. We formally test for the significance of the threshold model, and we relate the
results to the level of openness of the countries. Clearly, the threshold methodology will
not give us any additional insight for the relationship between inflation and globalization
for the countries that do not pass the test.10 Second, we further examine the countries for
which the threshold model is not rejected to determine whether the switch of the slopes
10Note that a nonrejection of the H0 in the F-test implies that a linear analysis of the
inflation dynamics is appropriate.
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Table 3: Hansen Test for Threshold Effect
Aus Aut Can Den Fra Ger Ire Ita Jpn Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK USA
F-test 1.83 3.81 2.62 6.38 1.13 2.91 7.15 3.47 2.77 1.94 6.53 2.51 3.73 4.37 5.31 2.00
p-value .13 .00 .03 .00 .44 .02 .00 .01 .16 .09 .00 .03 .01 .00 .00 .12
F-test is the value of the maximum F-statistic for the null of no-threshold effect with the corre-
sponding bootstrapped p-values as in Hansen (1997, 2000).
from one regime to the other is consistent with the predictions of the inflation globalization
hypothesis.
In the first stage of the analysis, we focus on the estimated thresholds; the results of the F-
test for the significance of the threshold model are reported in Table 3. We find a quite large
support for using a non-linear approach to examine the inflation globalization relation for
the countries we study. The F-test and corresponding bootstrapped p-values indicate that
openness is indeed a statistically significant threshold variable for all countries in the sample
except for Australia, France, Japan, and the U.S. Table 1 shows that Australia, Japan,
and the U.S. are the three countries that display the lowest average levels of openness in
our sample, while France has the sixth lowest. This evidence suggests that low degrees of
openness might not be sufficient even to trigger non-linear effects in Phillips Curve model.11
Thus we can classify these four countries as having no globalization effect on inflation.
Table 5 illustrates the results of the estimated threshold models for the countries that see a
significant threshold effect from openness. Like the linear model, the non-linear specification
of (2) also uses one lagged value of inflation and the average of the subsequent four lags.
Additionally, Figure 1 relates the estimated threshold of each country to its respective trade
11This interpretation may not apply to France, whose inflation is not affected by openness
in a clear manner. While the domestic output gap loses significance in France’s more open
regime, we also observe quite high bootstrapped p-values. Using a state space framework,
López-Villavicencio and Saglio (2014) have also shown that openness is not responsible for
the decline in the response of France’s inflation to its domestic output gap.
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Figure 1: Evolution of trade openness and estimated thresholds.
openness index. The estimated thresholds show some level of heterogeneity with the median
estimated threshold for openness at 49% and an inter-quartile range of 20%. This is not
entirely unexpected as there are clear differences in the structural characteristics of these
countries, especially in terms of the relative degree of integration in the global economy as
has been documented in Table 1. Similarly, the magnitudes of the estimated effects of the two
output gaps are characterized by good variability across countries, with more open economies
having in general larger estimated thresholds as well as experiencing stronger effects of the
foreign output gap. In this paper, our main purpose is documenting that countries experience
similar threshold effects from openness in their domestic inflation dynamics rather than
accounting for specific differences in the individual threshold estimates. Once the existence
and importance of the non-linear effects are assessed, one could think of estimating an average
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effect of globalization on inflation in a panel framework, for instance, after imposing some
restriction on the cross-sectional structure of the model.12
We turn next to the second stage of our empirical analysis. Table 3 showed that countries
with low levels of openness did not experience a significant threshold effect on their inflation
dynamics. While this is conceptually consistent with the non-linear role globalization can
have in the inflation process, we still need to assess the main predictions of the inflation
globalization hypothesis for all the remaining countries in our sample.
These predictions for the slopes of domestic and foreign output gaps across the two regimes
can be stated as:
1. As we move to the more open regime, the responsiveness of inflation to the domestic
output gap, β, is expected to decline, becoming less significant.
2. In the more open regime, the foreign output gap should replace the domestic output
gap, indicating a more significant and larger estimate of γ.
Based on these estimated output gap coefficients, we can sort the countries in Table 5 into
those displaying a full, a partial or no globalization effect. A full globalization effect is said
to occur for a country in which, going from the less to the more open regime, the foreign
and domestic output gap coefficients respectively turn from insignificant to significant and
from significant to insignificant (at 10% level of confidence, at least). On the other hand, a
partial effect is when we observe this change for only one of the two output gaps. Finally,
we treat all the remaining cases as having no globalization effect on inflation, along with
the countries for which the non-linear model is rejected. These classifications are quite
12In a companion paper, we exploit the cross-sectional dimension and the rich variation
in openness across countries to generalize our result by estimating the threshold effects in a
dynamic panel model.
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conservative since the inflation globalization hypothesis also would be formally valid when
both gaps are significant in the more open regime but the foreign gap is larger than the
domestic gap. Thus, our findings in favor of the inflation globalization hypothesis can be
viewed with even greater confidence.
Figure 2 helps us classify the countries for which a meaningful threshold is found. Solid bars
correspond to the estimated domestic output gap coefficients, while the criss-cross patterns
identify the coefficients for the foreign gap. The blue color is used to indicate switches
in the parameter’s magnitude and significance consistent with the globalization hypothesis
predictions; gray indicates cases which are not in line with the globalization hypothesis.
Given this information, it is easy to recognize that Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, and
Mexico all experience a full globalization effect as they move toward the more open regime.
The inflation dynamics for these nations are fully affected by an increase in globalization. In
addition to them, Germany, Ireland, Korea, Netherlands, and Spain display a partial effect
from openness that is reflected by a switch only in the foreign output gap. The estimates of
the Y f coefficients are large for all of them, and strongly significant for Germany and Ireland
in particular; at the same time, the Y d coefficient remains insignificant across regimes.13
The UK and Switzerland, on the the other hand, display a partial globalization effect due
to the domestic gap response, which loses significance in the more open regime. Overall, the
observed non-linear relation between inflation and the output gaps is broadly consistent with
the inflation globalization hypothesis for all the countries that pass the test of significance
of openness as a threshold in the Phillips Curve model.
13It is important to note that Ireland’s foreign output gap was significant in the linear
case as well. Accounting for non-linearity, we find inflation has an even larger response to
the external factors.
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Figure 2: Blue (gray) bars indicate output gap responses to the regime switch consistent (not
consistent) with the globalization hypothesis. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1
level.
Full globalization effect: Aut, Can, Den, Ita, and Mex. Partial effect (Y d only): UK
and Swz.
Partial effect (Y f only): Ger, Ire, Kor, Net, and Spn;
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Table 4: Linear Philips Curve
Aus Aut Can Den Fra Ger Ire Ita Jpn Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK USA
Constant 0.37∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.07 0.68∗∗∗ 1.41 0.23∗∗ 0.32∗* 0.15∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.06) (0.23) (0.91) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.22) (0.18)
Lag Inf 1.02∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Avg Lag -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11∗∗ -0.13∗∗ 0.05 -0.11 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.19∗∗∗ -0.12∗ -0.12∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Dom 0.09∗∗ 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.15 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.11∗∗ 0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.34) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
For -0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.13∗ 0.05 0.08 0.19 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.01
(0.13) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.48) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
RMSE 0.81 0.38 0.63 0.43 0.38 0.63 0.51 0.35 0.52 1.00 4.73 0.39 0.56 0.42 0.62 0.47
Adj R2 0.90 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.88 0.74 0.84 0.97 0.83 0.79 0.96 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.79
p-value†
Serial 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.32 0.97 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.77 0.86 0.05 0.00 0.08
ARCH 0.71 0.08 0.37 0.00 0.67 0.48 0.81 0.07 0.32 0.74 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.75 0.46
RESET 0.90 0.01 0.35 0.58 0.11 0.90 0.15 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.24 0.13 0.66 0.00 0.62 0.51
Inflation based on the CPI. Lag Inf is pit−1 while Avg Inf is 14(
5∑
k=2
pit−k) . HAC robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
†LM serial correlation test, ARCH test of conditional homoskedasticity and RESET is the Ramsey test
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
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Table 5: Threshold Phillips Curve
Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.340∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.574∗∗ 1.120∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.355∗ 0.117∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.22) (0.60) (0.10) (0.17) (0.07) (0.17)
Lag Inf 0.873∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Avg Lag -0.076 0.001 0.0476 -0.075 -0.080 -0.111∗∗ -0.069 -0.212∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗ 0.047 -0.132∗∗ -0.129∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Dom Gap 0.211∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.302 -0.020 0.237∗ 0.101 2.933∗ 0.121 0.043 0.370∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.39) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (1.46) (0.25) (0.11) (0.16) (0.04)
For Gap 0.060 -0.092 -0.085 -0.540 0.061∗ -0.223 0.121 0.457 -0.191 0.102 0.301∗ 0.126
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.42) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (1.39) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Dom Gap -0.159 -0.331 -0.106 -0.09∗ 0.026 -0.031 -0.110 -0.432 -0.020 -0.136 0.067 0.045
(0.11) (0.19) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.16) (0.28) (0.07) (0.22) (0.05) (0.24)
For Gap 0.242∗∗ 0.695∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.565∗ 0.444∗ 0.175∗ 0.257∗ -0.006 -0.099
(0.10) (0.39) (0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.06) (0.34) (0.25) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.22)
Threshold 0.648 0.604 0.497 0.423 1.041 0.303 0.595 0.305 0.734 0.354 0.502 0.425
Regime 1(%) 47 62 37 27 66 24 66 17 17 56 19 74
RMSE 0.37 0.61 0.40 0.62 0.48 0.34 0.99 4.44 0.38 0.54 0.41 0.59
Threshold are estimated so that each regime has at least 15% of observations in either Regime.
69
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
We next conduct a series of robustness exercises to check the validity of the main results based
on our preferred specification of the non-linear model discussed in Section 3.4.2. Numerous
interesting points are explored next, including the role of other possible competing interna-
tional factors in the inflation dynamics to the econometric robustness of the specification of
model (2).
Generally models of inflation that take into account a slowly evolving local mean perform
better than purely stationary specifications (Faust and Wright, 2013). One way we account
for this possibility is to have regime-specific intercepts in our threshold model and so allow
for different means of inflation in the open and closed regimes. For most countries the open
regime is associated with the later years of the sample, so a regime-specific intercept can
account for the lower mean of inflation that has been observed in these OECD countries. As
shown in Table A2, having regime-specific intercepts does not impact our threshold estimates
and for most countries we see a similar switch in the output gap coefficients as in Table 5.
We further address the possibility of a persistent downward trend in the individual inflation
series by demeaning the inflation series from a slow moving trend. In order to capture this
trend component accurately, we employ an exponential smoothing method on each country’s
inflation series with a weighting scheme similar to Cogley (2002). Cogley (2002) shows that
exponential smoothing filters out transient elements of CPI based inflation more effectively
than other traditional detrending methods, while Rich and Steindel (2005) find that the
exponentially smoothed series is able to track the underlying trend of inflation more closely
than core inflation measures created by excluding food and energy prices from the CPI.
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the individual-country threshold estimates for inflation in
deviation from its exponentially smoothed trend component. Again the estimates for most
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countries do not undergo much change from the baseline results in Table 5. We continue
to see Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Mexico exhibiting a full globalization effect; Germany,
Ireland and Netherlands exhibiting a partial effect due to the foreign gap only; and Korea,
Spain, and the UK seeing an effect from the domestic output gap only. Only for Canada
and Switzerland do we no longer observe any globalization effect when using the detrended
inflation series. Thus our results in support of the inflation globalization are robust even
after accounting for the downward trend of inflation in recent years.
We now consider specifications of the Phillips Curve in which we also allow traditional
external factors, such as real exchange rate depreciation, import prices inflation, and oil
prices, to have a role in determining domestic inflation. In our analysis we examine these
external controls as separate cases since including them altogether in a single model can
lead to issues of over-fitting and inaccurate inference, especially in the threshold case we are
studying, where there might not be sufficient observations in each regime to get consistent
estimates for a large number of parameters. This was also the strategy employed in Borio and
Filardo (2007) to test for the impact of traditional controls on their open-economy Phillips
Curve estimates.
From a theoretical perspective, Engel (2013) and Zaniboni (2008) have shown that besides
the foreign output gap, the exchange rate depreciation (under producer currency pricing) or
the term of trade (under local currency pricing) has a direct effect on inflation in the New
Keynesian Phillips framework. Also empirically, Mihailov et al. (2011) have found with a
GMM methodology that the relative change in the terms of trade is a more important factor
in driving inflation than the current domestic output gap for a sample of OECD countries.
We hence first consider the impact changes in the real exchange rate has on baseline threshold
model given in (2).
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Table A4 reports the results when the annual depreciation rate of the real exchange rate is
used as an additional control variable (constructed as the log difference of the trade-weighted
real exchange rate between one quarter and the same quarter of the previous year). As with
the output gaps, we allow the impact of the real exchange rate to vary across the two regimes.
All in all, these results are consistent with our earlier findings, with most countries continuing
to have the same estimated thresholds and similar bootstrapped p-values from the F-test
of threshold significance. Trade openness as a threshold variable for the inflation dynamics
is still rejected for Australia, France, Japan, and the U.S. The remaining countries still
have a statistically significant threshold effect, and display similar changes in their output
gap slopes as before from the close to open regime. For most of the countries, the real
exchange rate depreciation coefficient also does not switch in a consistent manner between
the regimes. Two exceptions are Korea and Switzerland, for which the real exchange rate
gains significance with the expected negative sign in the more open regime.14 In the case
of Switzerland, however, we no longer see a clear switch in the output gap slopes; for this
country, the effect of trade openness on inflation seems to be better captured by the exchange
rate channel than the foreign output gap.
We next turn to specifications that include oil and import prices as external controls in (2).
Following Ihrig et al. (2010), we include both import prices inflation and oil price inflation as
deviations from lagged core inflation so that an increase in these prices relative to domestic
prices implies higher domestic inflation. Using the relative deviations of these supply shock
variables is also consistent with the triangle model approach to capture inflation dynamics
(Gordon, 2011). The estimates for the models with import prices illustrated by Tables
14The real exchange rate is defined so that an increase of it corresponds to an appreciation
of the domestic currency and a loss of competitiveness of the domestic goods. A negative
sign of its coefficient is expected in the Phillips Curve, and an increase in significance of this
coefficient in the more open regime is consistent with the implications of the globalization
hypothesis.
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A5 of the Appendix. The results are generally robust to the use of oil prices as a supply
shock, while the regime switch is less clear for some of the countries once import prices are
included. In particular, we do not find a significant change in the output gap coefficients
from the closed to open regime for Canada, Italy, and Switzerland. It is also important to
stress that the effects of globalization related to the foreign output gap channel might in
many ways overlap with those determined by import prices, since a positive foreign output
gap would cause prices of foreign goods to increase and could be reflected in higher import
prices for the domestic economy. So including import prices as a separate regressor can
make it harder to empirically disentangle the effect of the foreign output gap from that of
import prices, and can potentially mask a switch between the regimes, at least for some of
the countries in our sample.
We now turn to the role of the energy and food components in the dynamics of domestic
prices. It is important to understand whether the impact of globalization on inflation is a
general phenomenon or more simply reflects the growing influence of global food and energy
prices. We thus repeat the analysis of Section 3.4.2 using core inflation instead of CPI
inflation in the threshold estimation. This substitution basically strips the more volatile
food and energy prices from the CPI and allows us to focus on a narrower and more policy-
oriented definition of inflation. For parsimony, we focus on the estimates without the external
controls and just allow the output gaps to switch between regimes. In general these results
with core inflation do not change much with the addition of the external controls.
Table A6 shows that the threshold Phillips Curve estimates are quite similar to those ob-
served in Table 5, which is not surprising given that the two inflation series are highly
correlated for most of the countries in our sample. Austria, Denmark, Mexico, and Korea
exhibit a full globalization effect; Canada, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and Spain see
a partial effect due to the foreign gap only; and Italy and the UK find a partial effect for
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the domestic output gap only. Notably, with core inflation both Australia and the U.S. also
see a statistically significant non-linear effect from openness, with the domestic output gap
coefficient losing significance in their more open regimes.
3.5 Conclusion
There are strong implications for the conduct of monetary policy if indeed it is the case
that inflation is more influenced by global rather than domestic conditions. For one, a di-
minishing response to domestic factors implies an increase in the sacrifice ratio so that it
becomes more costly to stabilize inflation through conventional policy actions (Calza, 2009).
Alternatively, policy makers may feel that globalization adequately anchors inflationary ten-
dencies through external competition and so are freer to concentrate on domestic output.
Given these important policy consequences, it becomes imperative to identify the exact role
globalization plays in the inflation process.
Our paper makes an interesting contribution to this debate by applying a threshold method-
ology to account for potential non-linear effects of trade openness on inflation dynamics. We
find evidence that trade openness is not rejected as threshold variable for the Phillips Curve
model for most of the countries in our sample, and this non-linear component must be explic-
itly modeled and included in the analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis. We find
that as countries reach a certain level of openness, their domestic inflation starts to respond
to external influences as captured by the foreign output gap. At the same time, relatively
closed economies that do not reach sufficient levels of openness, such as the U.S., do not
exhibit such non-linearity in the relation between inflation and globalization. Accounting
for non-linearities in the Phillips Curve reveals new evidence that contrary to the previous
literature, which often ignores these effects, helps to corroborate the inflation globalization
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hypothesis. Our threshold approach is robust to many alternative specifications, and pro-
vides a suitable tool to inform the policy making process with respect to the influence of
relevant external forces.
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3.6 Additional Tables
Table A1: SUR Phillips Estimates
Aus Aut Can Den Fra Ger Ire Ita Jpn Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK USA
Constant 0.50∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.09 0.60∗ 1.79∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.52∗** 0.18∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.24) (0.77) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15) (0.14)
Lag Inf 0.94∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.10∗ 0.82∗ 0.97∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Avg Inf -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.17∗ 0.04 -0.09 -0.28∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.12∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Dom Gap 0.11∗∗ 0.06 0.03 0.11∗∗ 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.10∗ 0.02 -0.23 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.22) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
For Gap -0.03 0.11∗ 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.48) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
RMSE 0.82 0.38 0.64 0.43 0.38 0.64 0.52 0.35 0.52 1.00 4.74 0.39 0.56 0.43 0.62 0.48
Sample 1985-2006. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: Threshold Estimates with Regime Specific Intercepts
Inflation Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Lag Inf 0.868∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Avg Lag -0.078 -0.272 ∗∗ 0.046 -0.075 -0.071 -0.101∗ -0.202∗∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.141∗∗ 0.023 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Constant 0.543∗∗∗ 1.932∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.534∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.041 2.161∗∗∗ -0.934 -0.549∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.47) (0.14) (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.44) (2.36) (0.12) (0.33) (0.08) (0.20)
Dom Gap 0.216∗∗ 0.042 0.161∗∗ 0.172 -0.020 0.227∗ -0.109 3.286∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.069 -0.012 0.120∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.23) (0.04) (0.13) (0.07) (1.58) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06)
For Gap 0.077 0.151 -0.082 -0.224 0.057 -0.204 0.449 1.567 -0.500∗∗∗ 0.269∗ 0.190∗ 0.415∗∗
(0.07) (0.21) (0.10) (0.20) (0.06) (0.22) (0.16) (1.59) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Constant 0.471∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.109∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.965 0.248∗∗ 0.476∗∗ -0.367∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.06) (0.26) (0.66) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Dom Gap -0.136 0.172 ∗∗ -0.105 -0.096∗ 0.011 -0.022 0.014 -0.391 -0.039 0.016 0.597∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.29) (0.07) (0.20) (0.27) (0.07)
For Gap 0.221∗∗ -0.123 0.182∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.263∗ 0.399∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.125 -0.450 -0.199
(0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.06) (0.15) (0.23) (0.09) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12)
Threshold 0.648 0.501 0.497 0.446 1.041 0.303 0.500 0.216 0.749 0.354 0.636 0.394
F-Stat 2.74 5.39 4.21 2.10 4.89 2.43 4.17 4.64 5.37 2.73 3.84 4.02
p-value 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.00
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Table A3: Threshold Estimates for De-Trended Inflation
Inflation Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Constant -0.047 -0.109 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.101 -0.140∗ -0.188∗∗∗ 0.053 0.347 0.004 -0.189∗∗ 0.002 -0.030
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.49) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Lag Inf 0.860∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Avg Lag -0.136∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.032 -0.072 -0.129∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ 0.075 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.1) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Dom Gap 0.240∗∗∗ -0.138 0.125∗ 0.206 -0.002 0.224∗ 0.092∗∗ 4.343∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.692∗ -0.026 0.153∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.3) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (1.56) (0.25) (0.30) (0.05) (0.04)
For Gap 0.084 0.457 -0.090 -0.220 0.042 -0.153 0.253 -0.679 -0.191 1.260∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.07) (0.35) (0.10) (0.30) (0.07) (0.20) (0.16) (1.77) (0.19) (0.33) (0.09) (0.08)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Dom Gap -0.062 0.220∗∗∗ -0.086 -0.123∗∗∗ -0.095 -0.052 0.102 -0.532 -0.026 0.122 0.055 0.062
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.29) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.27)
For Gap 0.163∗ -0.048 0.146∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.160 0.834∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.040 -0.139 0.039
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.31) (0.06) (0.17) (0.34) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.25)
Threshold 0.646 0.447 0.497 0.439 1.241 0.303 0.535 0.201 0.734 0.236 0.592 0.429
F-Stat 3.37 3.53 5.39 2.25 5.19 5.19 1.76 11.06 2.66 5.86 5.51 4.91
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02
Inflation is determined as CPI inflation minus its exponentially smoothed trend component.
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Table A4: Threshold Estimates with Real Exchange Rates
Inflation Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Constant 0.492∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.050 0.635∗∗∗ 0.444 0.227∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.052 0.516∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.06) (0.23) (0.46) (0.11) (0.18) (0.07) (0.17)
Lag Inf 0.871∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Avg Lag -0.076 -0.038 0.093 -0.055 -0.062 -0.073 -0.072 -0.203∗∗∗ -0.120∗ 0.053 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Dom Gap 0.213∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.235 -0.014 0.216∗ -0.064 0.944∗ 0.204 0.034 -0.159∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.36) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.49) (0.19) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
For Gap 0.056 -0.071 -0.102 -0.652 0.086 -0.202 0.198 0.786 -0.103 0.119 0.234∗∗ 0.133
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.41) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18) (1.00) (0.16) (0.19) (0.1) (0.09)
Real Exch 0.002 -0.025∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.006 -0.027 -0.004 -0.343∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.001 0.017∗ -0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Dom Gap -0.158 -0.329 -0.110 -0.073 -0.117 0.022 0.186∗∗ -0.145 -0.043 -0.173 0.095∗ -0.024
(0.11) (0.17) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) (0.24) (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.22)
For Gap 0.241∗∗ 0.656∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.063 0.333∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.290∗∗ -0.074 -0.033
(0.10) (0.35) (0.08) (0.1) (0.23) (0.06) (0.17) (0.2) (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) (0.22)
Real Exch 0.000 0.051∗ -0.016 -0.023∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.001 0.021 -0.017∗ 0.026
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Threshold 0.648 0.696 0.497 0.397 1.224 0.302 0.535 0.252 0.749 0.354 0.530 0.423
F-Stat 2.45 2.85 5.71 7.56 4.54 6.50 3.57 6.02 3.58 2.52 3.33 5.11
p-value 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01
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Table A5: Threshold Estimates with Import Prices
Inflation Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Constant 0.318∗∗ 0.13 0.187 0.214 0.384∗∗∗ 0.034 0.409∗ -0.067 0.204∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.079 0.591∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.14) (0.07) (0.25) (0.37) (0.11) (0.21) (0.07) (0.21)
Lag Inf 0.872∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Avg Lag -0.019 0.071 0.126 0.053 -0.088∗ -0.041 -0.079 -0.145∗∗∗ -0.119∗ -0.072 -0.038 -0.13∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.1) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Dom Gap 0.248∗∗∗ 0.064 0.153∗∗ 0.115 -0.021 0.024 0.098 -18.039∗∗∗ 0.169 0.294∗∗∗ -0.127 0.116∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.7) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (6.97) (0.23) (0.09) (0.14) (0.04)
For Gap 0.011 0.011 -0.127 0.098 -0.141 -0.034 0.083 -5.449∗∗∗ -0.224 -0.119 0.169 0.096
(0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.84) (0.12) (0.1) (0.14) (2.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Imports 0.005 0.005∗ -0.001 -0.027 0.006∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004 0.496∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.003 0.011∗∗ 0.001
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Dom Gap -0.176∗ 0.060 -0.109 -0.086∗ -0.022 0.039 -0.131 -0.334 -0.026 -0.306 0.055 -0.276
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (0.23) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06) (0.26)
For Gap 0.239∗∗∗ -0.154 0.119∗ 0.146∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.049 0.907∗ 0.414∗ 0.173∗ 0.320∗∗ -0.041 0.554
(0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.53) (0.27) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.36)
Imports 0.003∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.011 0.000 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Threshold 0.6317 0.5766 0.4967 0.3769 0.9009 0.3544 0.6698 0.1975 0.7491 0.3536 0.5064 0.4291
F-Stat 3.83 5.02 6.30 3.05 2.59 8.43 2.76 15.46 3.34 9.87 6.40 3.90
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.06
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Table A6: Threshold Estimates for Core Inflation
Inflation Aut Can Den Ger Ire Ita Kor Mex Net Spn Swz UK
Constant 0.322∗∗∗ 0.223∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.095 0.681∗∗∗ 0.058 0.493∗∗∗ -0.345 0.194∗∗ 0.516∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.109
(0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.17) (0.07) (0.17) (0.70) (0.09) (0.21) (0.06) (0.11)
Lag Inf 0.788∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.1) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)
Avg Lag 0.076 -0.011 -0.018 0.004 -0.078 0.020 -0.106 -0.112 -0.183∗∗ 0.211∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.003
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
Regime 1 (Open≤ θ0 )
Dom Gap 0.456∗∗∗ -0.018 0.121∗∗∗ 0.115 0.007 0.130∗ 0.087∗ 14.29∗∗∗ 0.031 0.120 -0.114 0.163∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (2.73) (0.05) (0.1) (0.09) (0.06)
For Gap -0.023 0.211 -0.036 0.076 0.048 0.024 -0.067 -2.783 0.009 0.194 0.334∗∗∗ -0.098
(0.07) (0.15) (0.06) (0.29) (0.06) (0.11) (0.21) (3.22) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Regime 2 (Open> θ0)
Dom Gap -0.160 0.098∗∗ -0.053 -0.028 0.002 0.032 0.014 -0.551 -0.124 -0.118 0.056 -0.078
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.37) (0.13) (0.16) (0.04) (0.28)
For Gap 0.302∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.090∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.005 0.295∗∗∗ 0.815∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.001 0.29
(0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10) (0.42) (0.14) (0.11) (0.05) (0.23)
Threshold 0.629 0.604 0.497 0.423 1.041 0.313 0.497 0.198 1.036 0.354 0.506 0.423
F-Stat 12.52 2.15 4.93 5.51 7.03 2.97 4.71 7.39 2.20 3.37 4.58 3.54
p-value 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.10
Inflation is determined as the four quarter change in the CPI excluding food and energy prices.
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4 Chapter 3
A dynamic panel threshold analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis
Abstract
Previous studies on the inflation globalization hypothesis have examined this question pri-
marily at the individual-country level. However, a panel approach seems quite appropriate
as globalization measures, such as trade openness, often exhibit considerable cross-sectional
variation. We thus investigate the relationship between inflation and globalization, under an
open-economy Phillips Curve framework, for a panel of OECD countries with the dynamic
panel GMM methodology developed in Arellano and Bond (1991). Using this framework,
we find strong evidence in favor of including global factors, represented by the foreign out-
put gap, in a country’s inflation process. We further augment the dynamic panel model
with a threshold component(Hansen, 1999), and so are able to identify regions of stronger
responsiveness of inflation to global factors. Based on our non-linear analysis, we show that
trade openness acts as a threshold variable for the effects of domestic and foreign slack on
inflation. Importantly, the switch in the output gap slopes from one regime to the other
is consistent with the key predictions of the inflation globalization hypothesis, so that in
more open economies the foreign output gap replaces the domestic output gap as the key
determinant in the country’s domestic inflation process.
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4.1 Introduction
Globalization has served as a catalyst for substantial changes in the behavior and functioning
of the modern economy. An area that has seen considerable emphasis and discussions, both
in policy and research circles, is the impact globalization, in the form of increased level of
international trade in goods and services, can have on the domestic inflation process. One
prominent view, known as the inflation globalization hypothesis, holds that highly intercon-
nected markets will allow external factors to eventually replace the domestic determinants of
inflation, so that local prices are guided primarily by global markets. Not surprisingly, this
has very significant policy implications as it would leave inflation untethered from traditional
monetary policy channels and could ultimately lead to changes in the way monetary policy
is conducted. It is thus essential to evaluate the validity of the inflation globalization hy-
pothesis and determine the exact role globalization plays in a country’s inflation dynamics.
Our paper shows that by adequately accounting for heterogeneity across countries as well as
allowing globalization to effect inflation non-linearly, we are able to see strong evidence in
favor of the inflation globalization hypothesis.
The inflation globalization hypothesis is a radical departure from the traditional view of
inflation dynamics being a function of inflation expectations and the current level of economic
slack or resource utilization in the domestic economy. While monetary policy is still expected
to influence inflation in the long run, the inflation globalization hypothesis allows foreign
factors such as the level of global slack to play the dominant role in the short run dynamics.
This is also in contrast to those who believe that globalization and increased competition has
been a contributing factor in reducing inflation rates around the world (Kamin et al. 2006),
but without changing the underlying inflation process (Pain et al., 2006). The validity of
the inflation globalization hypothesis would lead to fundamental changes in how inflation is
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modeled going forward along and force policy makers to place emphasis on global conditions.
A number of studies have examined the key prediction of the inflation globalization hypoth-
esis that the role of the foreign output gap in the determination of the domestic inflation
increases at the expense of the domestic output gap as a country becomes more integrated.
This prediction is usually tested in the context of the Phillips Curve, which has been the
workhorse model for inflation dynamics. The empirical findings however, have been mixed,
with little consensus on the importance of the foreign output gap and thus globalization
in a country’s inflation process. Borio and Filardo (2007) highly cited findings show that
including a measure of foreign slack in a reduced Philips Curve framework is appropriate for
every country in their sample. On the other hand, Ihrig et al. (2010) illustrate that these
results don’t hold when a more traditional approach to inflation expectations is employed in
the analysis.
We continue this line of inquiry but move away from the existing literature in two key aspects.
First, we rely on a panel analysis to investigate the relationship between foreign output gap
and inflation. Most of the previous work looks at this relationship at the individual-country
level and the panel methods, if used, are often very basic and supplementary. However, a
panel approach seems quite relevant as globalization measures such as trade openness ex-
hibit considerable cross-sectional variation as compared to within country variation. Indeed,
Bianchi and Civelli (2015) found some preliminary evidence that the effect of the global
economic slack on inflation is positively related to the degree of openness for a panel of
countries.
The second and main contribution of our paper is that we explicitly allow a country’s level
of trade openness, used here as a proxy of the country’s degree of globalization, to act as a
threshold variable in the inflation process. We can then determine the empirical relevance
of a threshold effect of trade openness in our panel framework, such that inflation responds
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to external factors only after a certain level of openness has been achieved by a country. A
number of economic factors can cause globalization to have a non-linear effect in the inflation
process. For instance, Sbordone (2007) has shown that one of the ways globalization can
affect the structural determinants of inflation is by reducing the market power of domestic
sellers through increased competition; however, it may be the case that domestic companies
only start to pay attention to foreign competitors after they have reached a significant level of
market share. At the individual country level, Ahmad and Civelli (2015) have examined this
non-linearity for a sample of OECD countries and have shown that for some countries the
observed changes in openness are just not large enough to actually induce structural breaks
in the inflation dynamics. Thus the potential of non-linearity should not be omitted from
any analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis, and by further exploring it in a panel
framework, we are able to exploit the cross-sectional variation in openness to identify the
regions where inflation responds strongly to foreign factors. Overall, our flexible modeling
approach should provide greater insight on the relationship between inflation and openness.
For our empirical analysis, we rely primarily on the dynamic panel GMM methodology
developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), which provide consistent and efficient estimates of
the panel model in the presence of lagged dependent variables. Thus the Arellano and Bond
(1991) framework is very convenient to incorporate inflation dynamics that are given by a
backward-looking Philips Curve model. In our analysis, we concentrate on the backward-
looking Philips Curve specification as it has been shown to be a better empirical fit in
capturing inflation dynamics (Rudd and Whelan, 2007). However, this methodology can be
extended to embed the New Keynesian Phillips Curve models, developed by Galı and Gertler
(1999), and so we will also examine a model that is consistent with a structural interpretation
of the inflation globalization hypothesis. Finally to augment the dynamic panel model with
a threshold component, we follow the recent contributions by Caner and Hansen (2004) and
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Kremer et al. (2013), that gives consistent estimates of the threshold for panel data even in
the case of endogenous regressors. Thus our paper is also part of the new empirical literature
that analyzes threshold behavior in a dynamic panel setting.
Our dynamic panel Philips Curve model is employed on the entire group of OECD countries
for the period 1970-2013. Two important results emerge from our estimates. First, we
see strong evidence that the foreign output gap is statistically significant and of the same
magnitude as the domestic output gap in the country’s inflation process. These results also
hold when we account for instrument proliferation in the dynamic panels and the possibility
of endogenous explanatory variables. Our main findings are also not affected either by the
inclusion of traditional controls such as movement in the real exchange rate, or by restricting
the sample period to control for clear changes in monetary policy regimes.
The second key finding of our analysis is that there is significant evidence of non-linearity in
our dynamic panel Phillips curve framework with countries seeing a meaningful shift in their
inflation dynamic once a level of openness is reached. Crucially, the switch in the output
gap slopes from one regime to the other is consistent with the key predictions of the inflation
globalization hypothesis in that the foreign output gap coefficient increases and switches
from non-significant to significant in the more open regime, while the domestic output gap
coefficient moves in the opposite direction and loses significance in the more open regime.
Thus the estimated 90% confidence interval of [35 − 57], for the openness threshold value,
can be used by policy makers as a guide on when to direct their attention to the influence
of external forces in the inflation process.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1.1 we review the current literature with
regards to the inflation globalization hypothesis. Section 4.2 looks at the motivation of a
panel approach and its validity. In Section 4.3 we discuss the main findings of the dynamic
panel analysis while Section 4.4 examines the panel threshold model. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.1.1 The relationship between globalization and inflation
The traditional approach in modeling inflation dynamics has been to focus on country-
specific factors, such as domestic output, while assigning a limited role to external factors,
usually in the form of supply shocks. However, the increased level of globalization that has
taken place in recent years in the form of greater openness to trade, financial integration, and
higher mobility across factor markets might have very well changed the nature of the inflation
process. So it may now be the case that domestic prices in highly integrated economies are
influenced more by global markets, rather than local markets.
Clarida et al. (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) extend the micro-founded New Keynesian
Phillips Curve for the case of an open economy with sticky prices, and this has quickly become
the workhorse model in the open-economy modeling literature.1 One of the key insights of
this model is that domestic inflation now depends on the weighted average of the domestic
and foreign output gaps, where the weights represent some preference for home goods.2 The
inclusion of the foreign output gap in the Phillips Curve shows that along with the direct
effects of trade on the price level, such as deviations in the import prices or the real exchange
rate, there is also a need for some measure of excess global demand, since low demand in
one country could be countered by high demand in another. In the extreme, as pointed out
by Borio and Filardo (2007), this implies that excess demand should actually be aggregated
at the product rather than the country level.
Another strong implication of this modeling framework is that as economies become more
open, the traditional relation between short-run inflation and the domestic output gap weak-
1This framework was used by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2008)
to analyze how openness affects optimal monetary policy.
2Zaniboni (2008) showed that this holds for different assumptions on the pricing behavior
of the exporting firms.
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ens, leading to the flattening of the Phillips Curve (Zaniboni, 2008). Sbordone (2007) and
Razin and Binyamini (2007) have shown that the diminishing sensitivity of inflation to do-
mestic output fluctuations can be associated with increased globalization, as the greater
competition in goods and factors of production reduces the market power of domestic sell-
ers. A flatter Phillips Curve also effects monetary policy as it becomes more costly to bring
inflation to desired target levels.3 Overall, this modeling framework has clear predictions
for the response of inflation to the domestic and foreign output gaps that can be tested to
determine the relationship between globalization and inflation.
4.1.2 Empirical Evidence
A general expression of the reduced form open-economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve model
in Clarida et al. (2002) can be given as
pit = αEtpit+1 + βY dt + γY
f
t + εt (1)
where pit is inflation, Etpit+1 is the expected inflation next period, Y dt and Y
f
t are the current
domestic and foreign output gaps, respectively.4 Generally, in the empirical literature, lags
of inflation are used as a proxy for Etpit+1 so that equation (1) becomes purely backward-
looking. While the resultant model lacks a structural interpretation, it still provides a
suitable reduced-form analysis of the underlying inflation dynamics. Further, there is strong
evidence that when compared with forward-looking models the backward looking model is
actually a better empirical fit (Rudd and Whelan, 2007) and also more structurally stable
3Razin and Binyamini (2007) argues that this leads monetary authorities to become more
aggressive toward inflation and reduce the weight on the domestic output gap.
4See Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010) for a micro-founded derivation of equation (1).
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(Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003). Lastly, it is also common in this analysis to add controls for
import prices or the terms of trade to capture the direct impact of trade on the price level.
A number of studies have used a model similar to equation (1) to investigate the inflation
globalization hypothesis and the role of the foreign output gap in the inflation process.5
For equation (1), the inflation globalization hypothesis implies declining estimates of β and
conversely higher magnitudes of γ as a country is integrated in the global economy. The
empirical evidence on the inflation globalization hypothesis, however, is quite ambiguous,
and there is still considerable debate on the validity of including the foreign output gap as
a determinant in a country’s inflation dynamics.
Borio and Filardo (2007) show that for a sample of 16 OECD economies, the foreign output
gap is statistically significant in explaining inflation and that these findings hold for different
measures of the foreign output gap. Gamber and Hung (2001) show that globalization
in the late 90s increased the sensitivity of U.S. inflation to foreign economic condition.
Wynne and Kersting (2007) also find similar evidence that global slack matters for the U.S.
inflation process. Furthermore, the IMF (2006) found that increased globalization has led to
a reduction in sensitivity of inflation to domestic capacity for a group of advanced economies.6
Ihrig et al. (2010) reexamine the findings of Borio and Filardo (2007) and show that the
foreign output gap becomes insignificant when more traditional proxies for expected inflation
5It is important to distinguish the studies on the inflation globalization hypothesis from
another strand that focuses solely on the direct impact on inflation from imports, especially
imports from developing countries (Kamin et al., 2006). These have generally found that, at
least in the case of advanced economies, import prices have only a modest downward impact
on domestic inflation (Pain et al. (2006), IMF, 2006 ).
6On the other hand, Ihrig et al. (2010) find little evidence that this decline was due
to increased globalization. Using a state-space framework, López-Villavicencio and Saglio
(2014) also determine that openness is not responsible for the flattening of the Philips curve
in the cases of the U.S., France and the U.K.
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such as pit−1 and earlier lags are instead used in these estimations.7 Calza (2009) also finds
that global output gaps have little success in explaining domestic inflation for the Euro area
as a whole. Using a structural model for the G7 countries, Milani (2010) determines that
global output impacts domestic inflation only indirectly and thus should not be included
in the Phillips Curve specification. Finally, Bianchi and Civelli (2015), employing a time-
varying VAR model, show that for most countries in their sample, the effects of the foreign
output gap on inflation are comparable to those of the domestic output gap, but these effects
have not grown over time.
4.2 A Panel Approach
The preceding empirical evidence on the inflation globalization hypothesis is primarily based
on analysis at the individual-country level. One of our main goals in this paper is to properly
account for variation in inflation and openness across countries and then use this variability
to evaluate the inflation globalization hypothesis. A panel approach blends the inter-country
differences with the intra-country dynamics, enabling a more complete picture to emerge.
4.2.1 Data and Motivation
For our analysis, we expand on the dataset used in Bianchi and Civelli (2015) to all of the 28
OECD countries with annual data from 1970 to 2013.8 As is the standard in this literature,
we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as our measure of the domestic price level with
inflation the year-to-year change in the CPI. Trade openness is calculated as exports plus
7In particular, Borio and Filardo (2007) used the trend of core inflation as a proxy for
inflation expectations which, as discussed in Ihrig et al. (2010), causes the residuals to become
auto-correlated and the model misspecified.
8Poland and Chile were excluded from our analysis because both of these countries ex-
perienced bouts of hyperinflation during this time frame.
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imports over GDP with all the values in nominal terms. The domestic output gap for each
country is calculated using an HP filter on the real GDP series (we account for the end-of-
sample problem by forecasting the real GDP five years ahead before applying the filter). As
in Bianchi and Civelli (2015), the foreign output gap and the effective real exchange rate
are calculated by weighting the trading partners of each country.9 The foreign output gap
for a country is then just the trade-weighted average of the domestic output gaps of all the
other countries in our sample. Similarly, the effective real exchange rate index is given by
the geometrically trade-weighted average of the pairwise real exchange rate.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of trade openness for the individual countries in this sample
period. We observe significant variation with relatively closed economies such as the U.S. and
Japan at one end of the spectrum while more open economies such as Netherlands and Ireland
on the other end. We see similar variation in Table 1, which gives us the summary statistics
for all of the variables pooled across country and years for a total of 1,232 observations.10
For each of these variables, we determine both its within standard deviation sw (measures
the variability across time) and its between standard deviation sB(measures the variability
across countries).11 As seen in Table 1 the between deviation for trade openness is nearly
twice the value of the within deviation, indicating that there is substantially more variation
in openness between countries than over time. Indeed, one of the main issues with analyzing
the inflation globalization hypothesis at the country level is that some countries, during the
sample period, may not experience changes in their level of openness large enough to induce
clear breaks in the relation between inflation and the foreign output gap. So a single-country
9To get accurate trade weights we included more than 70 other countries to our sample
universe. The list of countries and details on the trade weights are in the appendix 4.6.1.
10Te reduce the size of the panel in the dynamic panel analysis, we will concentrate on the
three-year averages of the Phillips Curve variables discussed in Table 1.
11These are calculated as s2W = 1NT−N
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(zit− z¯i)2 and s2B = 1N−1
∑N
i=1(z¯i− z¯)2 for
1 < i < N and 1 < t < T
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analysis is often an unsatisfactory tool to assess the true impact of openness on inflation. A
panel analysis, on the other hand, can use the cross-country variation in openness to better
capture the relationship between inflation and globalization. Finally, for the other variables,
including inflation, much of the underlying variation is a result of changes over time.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (1970-2013)
Variable Mean Std Dev Within Between Min Max
Inflation 9.60 20.96 18.45 14.08 -4.48 73.82
Openness 45.70 21.02 10.65 18.18 5.43 151.04
Dom Gap 0.02 4.56 4.60 0.20 -21.76 18.62
For Gap 0.40 2.47 2.50 0.21 -4.91 10.83
Real Exch Rate 0.25 6.20 6.24 0.57 -32.66 32.38
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Trade Openness measure for the OECD countries (1970-2013)
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The estimates of the individual Phillips Curve model given by equation (1), provide addi-
tional support for utilizing cross-sectional differences in openness to help understand the role
of globalization in the inflation process.12 Figure 2 shows the estimates of the foreign output
gap coefficient for each country plotted against its average level of openness. We see that
the countries with higher levels of openness are more likely to have a significant role for the
foreign output gap in their inflation process. Such a finding is consistent with the inflation
globalization hypothesis of a positive relation between globalization and the effects of global
economic slack on inflation. Figure 2 also indicates the potential of non-linearity in the
relationship between inflation and globalization, with a country having to achieve some level
of openness for the foreign output gap to matter in the inflation process. We will analyze
the possibility of such threshold behavior in Section 4.4.
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Openness
F
o
re
ig
n
 O
u
tp
u
t 
G
a
p
Figure 2: Individual Foreign Gap estimates along with the average level of openness.
12As in Ihrig et al. (2010) we use pit−1 as a proxy for Etpit+1 in these estimations.
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4.2.2 Is a Panel Analysis Valid?
Before embarking on the panel analysis, we need to make sure that a panel approach is
actually valid for our dataset. In particular, we address the validity of having the same slope
coefficients across the countries as well as the potential of exhibiting a unit root process.
In standard panel treatments, the assumption is that the slope coefficients are constant across
cross-sections with allowances made for varying intercepts to capture some of this cross-
sectional as well as time-specific heterogeneity (treated as either fixed or random effects).
But this assumption of poolability may not hold in a dynamic panel, especially with large
N and T , and so needs to be explicitly tested for in the analysis (Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
For relatively small N, the F-test can be used to test for poolability with the constant slope
assumption treated as a linear restriction on the N individual equations given by (1) (Bi = B
∀ i). Two variants of the F-test are available depending on the variance-co variance structure
of the disturbance vector ε = [ε′1, ε
′
2,...ε
′
N ]
′
, where the εi are the individual Tx1 error terms.
If these disturbances are assumed to be conditionally homoscedastic so that E[ε′ε] = σ2INT ,
then the standard F-test can be applied, with each of the N equations in the unrestricted
model estimated separately by OLS. Alternatively, a Roy-Zellner test as in the Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) framework (Zellner, 1962) can also be applied so that there is
a possibility of both heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous cross-correlations among the
individual disturbances. Bun (2004) has shown that the finite sample performance of these
tests is actually quite poor (a strong tendency to over-reject) in panel models with lagged
dependent variables and so need a bootstrap procedure to get accurate p-values.
Table 2 shows the results for the poolability tests conducted on equation (1) for our sample
countries. We see from the simple F-tests that the null of poolability is not rejected for
both the asymptotic and the bootstrapped p-values. Allowing for only the intercepts to
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vary (so the restricted case is then estimated by the Fixed Effects estimator) also does not
impact these findings. We next turn to the Roy-Zellner test, which allows for the more
realistic scenario of countries with hetroscedastic disturbances. In these tests, there is a
strong difference between the asymptotic and the bootstrapped p-values, and so we have
conflicting evidence on the suitability of pooling the slopes across countries. However, in a
simulation study Bun (2004) showed that classical asymptotic tests in dynamic panels have
substantial size distortions especially when used with a full disturbance covariance matrix.
On the other hand, the bootstrap test performed well in these simulations. Thus, based
on the high bootstrapped p-values in Table 2 we determine that pooling our data for 1
is appropriate. Finally, for robustness we also conducted a Hausman test as suggested in
Pesaran et. al (1996) and again see a similar finding for poolability.13
Table 2: Testing for Poolability
Statistic p-value
classic bootstrap
F-test (intercept and slopes) 1.08 0.27 0.41
F-test (slopes only) 1.09 0.27 0.35
Roy-Zellner test (intercept and slopes) 6.33 0.01 0.82
Roy-Zellner test (slopes only) 7.89 0.01 0.47
Hausman test 0.22 0.97 .
1000 repetitions used for the bootstrapped p-values.
As in the case of univariate analysis, unit roots can also lead to spurious regressions and
misleading inference in a panel framework. This is especially a concern with inflation, which
is often associated with high levels of persistence(Culver, 1997) . So in this section, we
13In the Hausman test we compare the Fixed Effect estimator with the Mean Group
estimator as has been proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Note that under the null of
poolability the Fixed Effects will be more efficient, but in the alternate only the Mean Group
is consistent. A non-rejection of the null then supports poolability of the data.
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determine the stationarity of our panel series by applying some general panel unit root tests.
Table 3 gives the results of these panel unit root tests. We first consider the standard
LLM test of Levin et al. (2002), which assumes a common autoregressive parameter for all
countries as well as no correlation among the cross-sectional units, except for common time
effects. We also account for cross-sectional correlation in these tests by using data demeaned
from common time effects. Based on the LLM bias-adjusted t∗statistic, the null of unit root
is rejected for all of our series. We then conduct the IPS test following Im et al. (2003)
which, unlike the LLM test, allows for heterogeneous intercepts and slopes for each country.
The results from the IPS test, controlling for serially correlated errors, are broadly similar,
and we continue to find little evidence for a unit root in these panel series. Finally, we also
conduct the Hadri (2000) LM test which instead tests for the null that the data are stationary
and can be used in cases where N is not too large. Table 3 shows that the Hadri LM test is
not able to reject the null of stationarity for all of these series. So based on these tests, we
will continue to treat all of our variables including inflation as stationary in the empirical
analysis. For a sample of OECD countries, Basher and Westerlund (2008) find inflation to
be stationary even with panel unit root tests that allow for cross-sectional dependence and
the possibility of structural change.
Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests
LLC test (common) IPS test (individual) Hadri test
Null: All panels have unit root All panels have unit root All panels stationary
t∗ p-value W t p-value Zτ p-value
Inflation -2.78 0.00 -3.65 0.00 1.17 0.12
Openness -1.78 0.03 -2.70 0.00 1.09 0.27
Dom Gap -5.84 0.00 -8.40 0.00 -1.43 0.92
For Gap -2.87 0.00 -4.19 0.00 2.74 0.03
Real Exch -23.89 0.00 -24.30 0.00 1.00 0.16
Lag length selected based on BIC criteria. The tests assume asymptotic normality.
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4.3 Dynamic Panel Analysis
4.3.1 Empirical Framework
We modify the individual country Philips Curve given in equation (1) to a panel framework
and obtain the following dynamic panel model:
piit = ρpii,t−1 + βY dit + γY
f
it + ηi + εit (2)
where i is the country identifier, t is a period index, ηi is the country-specific error term, εit
is the idiosyncratic shock, the lag term is a proxy for inflation expectations and the output
gaps are defined as before. Due to the dynamic nature of the model, pii,t−1 is endogenous in
equation (2) as E[pii,t−1ηi] > 0. The standard Fixed Effects (Within-Group) estimator also
can not be used to eliminate ηi as it will be biased and, for small T , inconsistent as well
(Nickell, 1981). One popular approach to eliminate the fixed effects ηi in a dynamic panel
framework is to apply instead a first-difference transformation on (2)and then instrument
the endogenous lag term. With predetermined initial conditions, E[pii,t−s(εit − εi,t−1)] = 0
for s ≥ 2, t = 3, .., T , and so pii,t−2 and earlier lags are valid instruments for (pii,t−1− pii,t−2).
For a given set of instruments the estimation can be done by either 2SLS (Anderson and
Hsiao, 1981) or General Method of Moments (GMM) with the GMM being more efficient
when errors are not assumed to be independent (Arellano and Bond, 1991).14
14In our analysis we do not rely on the System GMM estimator, which uses an additional
moment condition in the levels equation to estimate highly persistent series (Blundell and
Bond (1998)). The System GMM, however, requires a much stronger assumption that the
correlation between yit and ηi is constant over time so that the deviations of the initial
conditions from the steady state are uncorrelated with ηi, a condition that is not likely to
hold in the case of a country’s initial inflation levels.
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The consistency of the GMM estimator requires that all the instruments used are valid,
so having zero correlation with the error term. In our analysis, we will use two tests to
determine the validity of the instruments in the dynamic panel GMM estimation. The first
is the traditional Hansen (1982) J-test of over-identifying restrictions, with the null that the
selected instruments are all exogenous. The Hansen test can also be extended to determine
the validity of only a subset of the instruments, by looking at the difference in the J statistics
when both the full and subset of instruments are used in the estimation. This difference
follows a χ2 distribution and so can be used to test the validity of the excluded instruments
alone. While high p-values from the Hansen tests support the choice of instruments, a
legitimate concern with this test is that it quickly becomes undersized once the number of
instruments increases, as is often the case in dynamic panel estimations.15
We will also be using the Arellano and Bond (1991) serial correlation test to determine the
appropriateness of the lagged terms as instruments in the difference equation (so for example
pii,t−2 is not a valid instrument for (pii,t−1− pii,t−2) if εit is serially correlated with εi,t−1). The
Arellano and Bond (1991) test checks for the nth order serial correlation in the levels equation
by examining if the residuals of the differences equation are correlated at order n + 1 (so
tests if εit− εi,t−1 is actually correlated with εi,t−n− εi,t−n−1).16 A failure to reject the null of
no serial correlation for this test then supports the lags used as instruments in the dynamic
panel estimation.
15Results of these tests are questionable once the instrument count exceeds N in the
estimation (Roodman, 2009).
16In the case of an orthogonal transformation, this test is still applied on the differences
equation since all the residuals, after the orthogonal transformation, will be interconnected
with the forward observations.
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4.3.2 First Results
Table 4 gives the estimates of the equation (2), while using the three-year averages for all the
variables. Taking three-year averages, instead of annual values, ensures that we have a short
panel with T (15 periods) smaller than N (28 countries) that can be efficiently estimated by
the dynamic panel GMM estimator.17 Such an approach has been commonly used in the
empirical growth literature where usually five-year averages are taken to investigate growth
relationships. However, for robustness we will in 4.3.4, also consider a panel estimation that
employs only annual data.
The first two columns of Table 4 show the Pooled OLS (POLS) and Fixed Effect (Within
Mean) estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The lagged
inflation term is significant in both cases and, as expected from individual country Philips
Curve estimates, quite large (0.82 and 0.70 respectively). However, due to the endogeneity
of the lagged term, the Pooled estimate is going to be biased upward while the Fixed Effect
estimate is going to be biased downward (Bond, 2002). The domestic gap is significant in
both cases, but the foreign output gap is significant at the 10% level only in the Fixed Effect
estimation. These output gap coefficients however, can also be biased depending on how
correlated they are with the lagged inflation term.18
To eliminate the fixed effects ηi we next turn to the first-differences transformation. To con-
trol for endogeneity in the differences equation, the 2SLS estimator is initially used with the
twice-lagged inflation term pii,t−2 serving as the instrument for pii,t−1− pii,t−2 (just identified
case). The estimates shown in the third column, though, are dramatically different as the
17By using three-year averages we in effect move away from the short-run fluctuations in
inflation and so are better able to capture the impact of the gradual changes in openness.
18The foreign output gap is also significant when we use the Fixed Effect estimator on the
annual data. A larger T dimension reduces the Fixed Effects bias and makes the estimates
more reliable. See Appendix 4.6.2 for more details.
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lagged inflation term now has a value greater than 1 (making the Phillips Curve unstable),
and both the gaps are found to be insignificant. The issue, according to Roodman (2006),
is that the 2SLS estimates are not accurate if the errors are not truly independent, as is the
case for the differences equation (εit− εi,t−1 is correlated with εi,t−1− εi,t−2 ). Thus a GMM
estimator is needed to account for the non-spherical error term in the differences equation.
Columns four and five in Table 4 show the GMM estimates of the first-differences equation
in which all valid lags of inflation are used as instruments (a total of 94 instruments for
each estimation). An issue that arises with GMM estimations in small samples is that the
estimated standard errors are downward biased. Thus the early approach in the empiri-
cal dynamic panel literature, was to sacrifice efficiency and get consistent estimates of the
standard errors by using the one-step GMM estimator.19 Windmeijer (2005), however, has
proposed a small-sample bias correction for the two-step GMM estimator which alleviate
these concerns and enables more accurate inference. We employ both GMM estimators with
the Windmeijer corrected standard errors and see they give identical results. The lagged
inflation term has a coefficient of 0.74, a reasonable value falling between the earlier POLS
and Fixed Effect estimates. Further, both gaps are significant with the foreign output gap
larger than the domestic output gap. Finally, in column six we employ the forward orthogo-
nal deviations instead of first-differences to eliminate the fixed effect term.20 The benefit of
this transformation is that if the error terms are independent then they remain so even after
the transformations. The coefficients from the two-step GMM estimation are similar with
now both the domestic and foreign output gaps significant at the 5% level. Thus switching
from first-differences to orthogonal deviations does not impact the main results.
19Note that for the one-step GMM estimator, the weighting matrix does not depend on any
estimated parameter, so making asymptotic approximations more reliable than the alternate
two-step GMM estimator (Bond, 2002).
20This transformation is expressed as y∗it = cit(yit −
1
Tit
∑
s>t
yis).
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Table 4: First Glance Panel Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 1-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM
Equation Levels Levels Difference Difference Difference Orthogonal
Lag Inf 0.803∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Dom Gap 0.369∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.475 0.383∗ 0.389∗ 0.325∗∗
(0.17) (0.14) (0.33) (0.22) (0.22) (0.14)
For Gap 0.437 0.453∗ 0.474 0.549∗∗ 0.539∗ 0.449∗∗
(0.27) (0.23) (0.69) (0.28) (0.28) (0.22)
Constant 1.433∗∗ 2.360∗∗∗ -0.105 1.968∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 2.037∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.23) (0.18) (0.67) (0.65) (0.69)
Observations 392 392 364 364 364 364
RMSE 10.99 10.71 18.31 13.53 13.53 11.11
Sample period 1970-2013. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticty and clustered at
country level in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
4.3.3 Concerns with Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation
A number of recent studies, including Bazzi and Clemens, 2013, Roodman, 2009 and Bun
and Windmeijer, 2010, have cast doubt on the dynamic panel GMM estimations that have
been employed in prominent empirical applications. In particular, three key issues have been
raised in regards to this estimation methodology:
1. The number of instruments used.
2. Potentially weak instruments.
3. Endogeneity concerns.
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We address each of these issues as it relates to our own dynamic panel GMM estimates
presented in Table 4 and show that our findings remain robust in these scenarios.
Since lags of the dependent variable are often used as instruments in the GMM estimation of
dynamic panels, more and more lags become valid instruments as the time period increases.
This proliferation of instruments, however, is not without costs as discussed in Roodman
(2009). First, a large number of instruments can overfit the endogenous variables, leading
to biased estimates in the second stage of the estimation (in theory, the more the instru-
ments there are the closer we get to the original biased OLS estimates). A large number of
instruments also weakens the Hansen test for instrument validity, so in extreme cases the
null is never rejected (Bowsher, 2002). Given these concerns, we check the adequacy of our
dynamic panel estimates by reducing the number of lags used as instruments in the GMM
estimation. 21
Table 5 reports the results of the two-step GMM estimation of the dynamic panel with the
reduced instrument set. We start with the forward orthogonal transformation and in each
time period, we use only the last two lags from the instrument set to give us a total of
28 instruments in the GMM estimation (excluding period dummies). Encouragingly the
estimates are similar to those seen in Table 4, with both the domestic and foreign output
gaps remaining significant at the 5% level. The next four columns look at the sensitivity of
these estimates by changing the instrument set as we go from using only the most recent
lag each time period (a total of 16 instruments), to collapsing the full instrument set (again
16 instruments), to collapsing the second-lag instrument set (corresponding to only two lags
of inflation as instruments) to finally collapsing the first-lag instrument set (corresponding
to the just identified case). We see that in all these cases the estimates for the domestic
and foreign output gaps remain significant while the lagged inflation term continues to have
21See appendix 4.6.3 for details on the instrument sets made by these methods.
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theoretically appropriate values. In the last three columns of Table 5, we estimate (2)
with the first-differences transformation. We again see that the results from the reduced
instruments are similar to the corresponding full-instrument estimates in Table 4.
With the reduced number of instruments we are also able to use the Hansen test of instrument
validity with greater confidence. Based on the p-values we can not reject the null of valid
instruments for most of the instrument sets in Table 5 (the sole exception is the one-lag
instrument set). We also use the difference-in-Hansen test to look at the validity of a subset
of the instrument variables (in our case these are the foreign and domestic output gaps which
have been used to instrument themselves). The high p-values from these tests generally
support treating these output gaps as exogenous.
Table 5: Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation (reduced instruments)
Orthogonal Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV Set (pii,t−1) Second-lag First-lag Collapsed Two Lags One Lag Second-lag First-lag Collapsed
Lag Inf 0.763∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.843∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03)
Dom Gap 0.334∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.354 0.299 ∗ 0.336
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.10) (0.19) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24)
For Gap 0.457∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.4730∗ 0.540∗∗ 0.850∗∗ 0.541∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.31) (0.39) (0.38)
Constant 1.779∗∗ 1.417∗∗ 0.737 0.031 0.597 1.832∗ 1.577∗ 0.799
(0.78) (0.62) (0.52) (0.49) (0.55) (0.89) (0.95) (0.43)
Instruments 28 16 16 5 4 28 16 16
p-values
AR(2) test 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23
Hansen J-test 0.28 0.05 0.10 0.22 . 0.28 0.22 0.09
Diff-in-Hansen 0.71 0.46 0.20 . . 0.88 0.54 0.21
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
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Even with valid instruments, the IV estimates from 2SLS or GMM can still be biased if
there is weak correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variables. The bias of
the IV estimator increases as the correlation weakens and approaches the initial biased OLS
estimates (Stock et al., 2002). Furthermore, inference in the presence of weak instruments
leads to misleading results, especially in tests of over-identifying restrictions (Hahn and
Hausman, 2002).
It has thus become necessary to test the strength of the instruments used in the IV estimation.
The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) LM test can be used to test the rank condition of the
instruments and is also robust to non-i.i.d. errors. A rejection of the null then implies
that the structural equation is properly identified. To test for weak instruments, Stock and
Yogo (2005) have also proposed an F-statistic in the first-stage regressions that is based on
the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald statistic and is able to incorporate multiple endogenous
variables. Notably, Stock and Yogo (2005) apply this F-statistic to construct critical values
that can be used to identify instruments as weak for certain levels of relative bias and size
distortions of the Wald test for parameter inference.22
Table 6 shows the weak instrument tests for the dynamic panel estimations that were re-
ported in Table 5. We look at both the first-differences and orthogonal transformations
along with the different instrument sets that have been used in Table 2 to reduce instrument
proliferation.23 Focusing first on the orthogonal transformations, we see that the Kleibergen-
Paap LM test strongly rejects the null, so we can use each of these instrument set to identify
the structural equation. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic based on the first-stage regres-
sions is also quite high for these instrument sets. We then compare this statistic with the
22These critical values depend on the type of IV estimator being used along with the
number of endogenous variables and excluded instruments in the regression.
23When conducting the weak instrument tests for the orthogonal transformation case, all
regressors in the 2SLS are orthogonally transformed and instrumented by the lagged levels
analogous to the dynamic panel GMM estimation.
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corresponding Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values and can see that the instruments are
sufficiently strong such that the asymptotic relative bias of the 2SLS estimator is less than
10%, so making IV estimates based on these instruments reliable for inference. Table 6 also
reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic which is a robust analog of the Cragg-Donanld
statistic and allows for the possibility of non i.i.d. errors. Again we see quite high val-
ues for our instrument sets which indicate that weak instruments are not a problem in our
IV estimation. Note that the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values are only valid for the
i.i.d. case and so caution should be exercised when using them with the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald statistic (Baum et al., 2007). Finally we see similar results for the first-differences
transformation, although the Cragg-Donald statistic are not as high as the corresponding
orthogonal transformations, indicating that lagged levels are stronger instruments when the
level equation undergoes an orthogonal transformation. So going forward we will rely on the
orthogonal transformation for our dynamic panel GMM estimates.
Table 6: Weak Instruments in dynamic panel
Orthogonal Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Set (pii,t−1) Second-lag First-lag Collapsed Second-lag First-lag Collapsed
Excluded Instruments 25 13 13 25 13 13
Kleibergen-Paap LM Stat 45.38 27.71 39.28 42.93 33.61 30.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Cragg-Donald Wald Stat 96.73 160.23 103.73 19.60 29.85 12.23
Kleibergen-Paap Wald Stat 117.51 81.25 16.15 103.57 81.50 3.95
Stock-Yogo Critical values
Relative bias > 10% 11.38 11.52 11.52 11.38 11.52 11.52
Size of 5% test >15% 38.77 24.42 24.42 38.77 24.42 24.42
These tests are conducted with 2SLS where the number of excluded instruments are the lags
of inflation in the IV set. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the
structural equation is underindentified with the p-values in parenthesis. With only one engoge-
nous variable, the Cragg-Donald Wald test is analagous to the standard first stage F-test (the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald test extends it to the case of heteroskedastic disturbances).
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The Hansen tests in Table 5 are generally supportive of the validity of the instruments used
in the GMM estimation, including treating the output gaps as exogenous variables. However,
as discussed in Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010), output gaps in practice are measured
with considerable error since potential output is not directly observable, and further aggre-
gate data from emerging economies, needed to construct foreign output gaps, is unreliable
and often times incomplete. Given this bias from measurement error and the potential of
past shocks to influence the output gaps, the exogenity of the output gaps may not hold
in equation (2). So we next examine the robustness of our findings by changing the in-
struments used for the output gaps. More specifically, instead of treating both output gaps
as strictly exogenous, we consider the scenario where the output gaps are treated as either
predetermined variables (E[Yisεit] = 0 for s ≥ t) or as endogenous variables (E[Yisεit] = 0
for s > t).24 When the gaps are taken as predetermined then Yt−1 and earlier lags are valid
instruments for Yt−Yt−1 in the differences equation (when gaps are taken as endogenous we
use Yt−2 and earlier lags as valid instruments for Yt − Yt−1).
The results of these estimations based on the orthogonal transformations are reported in
Table 7 with caution being exercised in regards to the number of lags used as instruments.
To be consistent we use the same instrument set for the lagged inflation term (Two Lags
(collapsed) set in Table 5) and vary only the lags used as instruments for the output gaps.
In the first three columns of Table 7 the output gaps are taken as predetermined, and we
see similar estimates as the instrument set for the output gaps is reduced. In all three
columns, both gaps are significant and similar in size to those found in Table 5. Further,
the Hansen test is unable to reject the validity of these lags of output gaps as instruments
in these estimations. In the last three columns of Table 7 we treat the gaps as endogenous
and continue to see significant output gap estimates.
24Note that both predetermined and endogenous variables allow past shocks to influence
the current values.
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Table 7: Controlling for Potential Endogeneity
Predetermined Endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Set (Yi,t) Collapsed Two lags One Lag Collapsed Two lags One Lag
Lag Inf 0.857∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)
Dom Gap 0.431∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.423∗ 0.189 0.470
(0.21) (0.12) (0.10) (0.23) (0.25) (0.35)
For Gap 0.433∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.605∗ 0.729∗ 0.161
(0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.32) (0.42) (0.34)
Total Instruments 31 7 5 29 7 5
Hansen J-Test 0.50 0.12 0.22 0.34 0.16 0.22
Gaps predetermined(endogenous) then Yt−1 (Yt−2) and earlier are used in the instrument set.
4.3.4 Robustness Checks
We next look at the validity of our main findings by adding external trade controls to the
inflation process as well as by restricting the sample to periods after 1984. We use the
period-to-period change in the real exchange rate as the control for direct effects of trade
on domestic prices. The real exchange rate is a suitable empirical proxy for the terms of
trade which is often incorporated as a structural determinant of inflation in an open-economy
Phillips Curve framework (Gali and Monacelli 2005). In this regard the real exchange rate is
a better than import price indexes, which have also been used as controls in earlier studies.
By looking at the periods after 1984, we are also able to better account for the structural
break in inflation that occurred for most advanced economics in this era (Rapach and Wohar,
2005). The significant decrease in inflation rates in the early 80s was often a result of
more aggressive central bank actions, so it is inappropriate to link this decline solely with
higher levels of globalization and trade openness (Calza, 2009). A further benefit is that by
restricting the sample to 1984-2013 we are able to reduce the time dimension of our panel
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and, in doing so, are able to use annual data instead of three-year averages in our dynamic
panel analysis. Our overall goal in this section is to see whether these changes impact the
output gap responses, especially the significance of the foreign output gap that was found in
the earlier dynamic panel estimations.
Table 8 gives the estimation results of the dynamic Phillips Curve with the trade control for
the full sample period. We again look at different sets of instruments for the same speci-
fication to ensure that our findings are robust to choice of instrument set. In the first two
columns, we see that the foreign output slopes remain significant but are slightly diminished
in terms of magnitude from the estimates in Table 5. One aspect could be that the real
exchange rate variable is now capturing some of the impact of globalization on inflation.
Indeed, the real exchange rate term has a negative sign, which is appropriate since an in-
crease in the real exchange rate should lead to lower inflation. Still Table 8 shows that the
impact from changes in the real exchange rate is not strong enough to be a significant deter-
minant in the inflation process. We also tested our model with just the real exchange rate
term (excluding the foreign output gap term) in our specifications and find it to have little
significance. In columns five and six we include trade openness as a direct determinant of
inflation and see little change from the baseline results, with trade openness having a slight
negative effect on inflation levels. Samimi et al. (2012), using a broad measure of globaliza-
tion, have also found that inflation is lower in more open countries. As in IMF (2006), we
also considered the interaction term of the foreign output gap and trade openness in these
specifications but it was found to be insignificant. Overall, the results support the use of
the foreign output gap as the best measure to capture the effects of external factors in the
inflation process.
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Table 8: Trade Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV Set (pii,t−1) Collapsed One Lag Collapsed One Lag Collapsed One Lag Collapsed One Lag
Lag Inf 0.861∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Dom Gap 0.363∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.20) (0.10) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15)
For Gap 0.369∗∗ 0.453∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.440∗
(0.17) (0.24) (0.17) (0.24)
Real Exch -0.204 -0.263 -0.215 -0.278
(0.22) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26)
Openness -0.051 -0.068∗ -0.049 -0.071∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Instruments 17 5 16 4 17 5 16 4
p-values
AR(2) Test 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24
Hansen J-Test 0.11 . 0.47 . 0.60 . 0.28 .
Diff-in-Hansen 0.10 . 0.85 . 0.73 . 0.69 .
Notes: One Lag uses the collapsed first-lag only instrument set for pit−1. See also Table 5
Table 9 gives the estimates of (2) for annual data from 1984-2013. We continue to observe
that the foreign output gap is significant and has a bigger impact on inflation than the
domestic output gap across the various specifications and instrument sets. In columns seven
and eight, we further restrict our sample to the period 1984-1998 to exclude the effects of the
common monetary framework that was adopted by some of the European Monetary Union
countries in our panel (Grüner and Hefeker, 1999). The estimates for the foreign output gap
remain significant and with similar magnitudes, so we can be reasonably confident that the
increased impact of the foreign output gap on inflation dynamics is not an artifact of some
of our panel countries having a single monetary regime in the latter years of the sample.
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Table 9: Dynamic Panel GMM estimates (Annual data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Set (pii,t−1) Collapsed One lag Collapsed One lag Collapsed Two lag
Lag Inf 0.934∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18)
Dom Gap 0.047 0.056∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
For Gap 0.229∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Real Exch Rate -0.082 -0.130 -0.054 -0.125
(0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
Second Lag Inf 0.168∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.09) (0.08)
Total Instruments 8.00 4.00 9.00 5.00 9.00 6.00
p-values
AR(2) 0.70 0.65 0.73 0.89 0.14 0.07
Hansen J-Test 0.27 . 0.26 . 0.19 .
Sample period 1984-2013 with robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.4 Threshold Analysis
Using a dynamic panel framework, we have shown a clear role for globalization factors
such as the foreign output gap in the standard Phillips Curve. We now turn our attention
towards investigating whether there is a non-linear relationship between globalization and
inflation. It seems rather intuitive that as a country becomes more open, it should also be
more influenced by external factors. Ahmad and Civelli (2015), focusing at the individual
level for a sample of OECD countries, have shown: 1) trade openness is an appropriate
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threshold variable for most nations’ Phillips Curve; 2) the influence of the foreign output
gap on inflation replaces that of the domestic gap after a country reaches a certain level of
globalization. By examining the threshold effect in a panel setting, we are able to exploit not
only the time variation in openness at the country level but also the substantial differences
in openness across countries. Thus we should be able to get more robust estimates of the
threshold in a panel framework. The estimated threshold for openness can then be used as
a guide to identify the regions where foreign factors start to dominate domestic factors in
determining a country’s inflation level.
4.4.1 Methodology
We investigate potential non-linearity in the inflation globalization relationship using the
following dynamic panel threshold Phillips Curve model:
piit = ρipii,t−1 + (β1Y dit + γ1Y
f
it )I(Open ≤ τ) + (β2Y dit + γ2Y fit )I(Open > τ) + ηi + εit (3)
where trade openness acts as the threshold variable in the relationship between inflation
and the output gaps and causes the switch from one regime to another. Trade openness
is a popular proxy for a country’s level of globalization and is especially relevant because
inflation in an open-economy Phillips Curve is affected by external factors primarily through
the trade channel. Model (3) allows openness to influence only the slopes of the gaps,
while the persistence given by the lagged inflation terms is the same for each regime. Bick
(2010) has shown that regime intercepts can often play a significant role in a panel threshold
analysis. Thus for robustness we estimate equation (3) with and without a regime-specific
intercept term. Overall this threshold model incorporates potential non-linearity in a simple
manner such that the foreign output gap impacts inflation only after a country achieves a
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certain degree of openness.
Hansen (1999) has developed an asymptotic theory that can be used for both estimating
and testing non-dynamic panel threshold models. The key is to eliminate first the fixed
effects using the standard within-mean transformation and then, as in the cross-sectional
framework (Hansen, 2000), the consistent estimate for the threshold is the one that minimizes
the residual variance of the regression. The standard approach is to use a grid search over all
the values of the threshold variable and then, conditional on this threshold value, estimate
the remaining variables in each regime by least squares. An F-test or the heterscedasticity-
consistent Wald Test can be used to determine if the slopes in the two regimes are significantly
different from one another and thus the overall appropriateness of the non-linear model.25
However, the distribution of these test statistics is non-standard, so Hansen (1999) suggests
using a bootstrap approach to approximate the asymptotic null distribution of the test
statistic.
The above approach is valid only when all the explanatory variables in the model are strictly
exogenous. Caner and Hansen (2004) extend the threshold model to account for the possi-
bility of endogenous regressors by performing the threshold estimation in three stages. First,
they regress the endogenous variables on the instruments along with the other exogenous
explanatory variables in the model. They then use these predicted values of the endogenous
variables instead of the actual values in the grid search for finding the threshold estimate.
Lastly, the estimated threshold is used to split the sample and a 2SLS or GMM estimator is
used to get the coefficient estimates in each regime.
The endogenous threshold framework in Caner and Hansen (2004) can be adapted to the
25TheWald Statistic is calculated asWT (γ) =
[
θˆ1(γ)− θˆ2(γ)
]′ [
Vˆ1(γ)− Vˆ2(γ)
]−1 [
θˆ1(γ)− θˆ2(γ)
]
where for a given value of γ in the grid search, θˆ1, θˆ2 are the slope estimates and Vˆ1,Vˆ2 the
estimated covariance matrices in each regime. The maximum WT from the grid search is
then be used to test H0 : θ1 = θ2.
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non-dynamic panel case by simply removing the individual-specific fixed effects and then
proceeding as before. However, with dynamic panels the within-mean transformation can-
not be used to eliminate ηi because it leads to inconsistent estimates due to the correlation
between the transformed dependent variables and the error term. The first-differences trans-
formation is also not appropriate as it causes the transformed error terms to become serially
correlated.26 On the other hand, the forward orthogonal transformation is able to remove ηi
while also preserving the original error structure and so maintains the serial independence of
the transformed error term (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Kremer et al. (2013) were the first
to make use of this approach, showing with a Monte Carlo study that it led to significant
improvement in the estimation of dynamic panel threshold models. 27
We follow a similar methodology in estimating the dynamic panel threshold model given
in (3). We first use a forward orthogonal transformation on all the variables except the
threshold variable and the instruments (the lagged inflation terms). We then regress the
transformed endogenous variable pi∗t−1 on the selected instrument set, and their predicted
values are then used in the grid search procedure. We conduct the grid search on the sorted
values of the threshold variable, which have been trimmed 15% on each side to ensure enough
observations in each regime. Using the consistent threshold estimate, we estimate model (3)
with GMM to obtain the coefficients in each regime (for the GMM estimation we employ
the same robust weighting matrix that was used in the dynamic panel analysis with all
the standard errors adjusted using the Windmeijer (2005) correction). Finally we employ
a bootstrap procedure, as described in Caner and Hansen (2004), to test the statistical
significance of the threshold in our model.
26An independent error term is a key requirement for the asymptotic distribution theory
in Hansen (1999).
27This methodology has been also used to investigate the non-linear impact on economic
growth from public debt (Baum et al., 2013) as well as from financial development (Law and
Singh, 2014).
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4.4.2 Threshold Estimates
Table 10 gives the results of the dynamic panel threshold estimation. As in the dynamic
panel analysis, having a large set of instruments can potentially bias the estimates of the
threshold model. Thus we remain conservative in the choice of the lagged inflation terms
used in the instrument set, restricting them to the collapsed, two lags only and one lag only
options. Focusing on the model with a regime-specific constant, we see that the estimated
threshold τ is around 52% which splits the sample into 246 observations in the closed regime
and 146 observations in the open regime (so more observations classified closed than open
for this threshold estimate). The 90% Confidence Interval (CI) for τ is given by [35, 57] and
notably this CI is also robust across the different instrument sets used in Table 10. Further,
the bootstrapped p-values for the Wald test easily reject the null of no threshold for this
model, and so we can conclude that trade openness does indeed have some non-linear effects
on a country’s inflation dynamics.
If the inflation globalization hypothesis is valid, then we would expect the following:
1. In the more open regime, the response of inflation to the domestic output gap, β should
decline and become less significant.
2. In the more open regime, the foreign output gap should replace the domestic output
gap, indicating a more significant and larger estimate of γ.
Examining Table 10 and focusing on the collapsed instrument set in the first column, we see
that in the less open regime the domestic output gap is highly significant while the foreign
output is insignificant and does not play an important role in the inflation process. However,
in the more open regime we see a clear shift in the output gap slopes with the foreign output
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Table 10: Dynamic Panel Threshold estimates
(1) (2) (3)
IV Set (pii,t−1) Collapsed Two Lags One Lag
Threshold 51.79 51.93 51.93
90% CI [35.44, 57.05] [35.44, 57.05] [35.44, 57.05]
Lag Inf 0.8637∗∗∗ 0.8472∗∗∗ 0.8957∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.23) (0.20)
Open≤ τ Constant 0.8977 0.0674 0.0337
(246 obs) (0.71) (2.26) (1.87)
Dom Gap 0.4948∗∗∗ 0.4878∗∗ 0.6831∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.24) (0.27)
For Gap 0.3409 0.5621 0.3084
(0.26) (0.37) (0.41)
Open≤ τ Dom Gap 0.0642 0.0605 0.0541
(146 obs) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
For Gap 0.6873∗∗ 0.8822∗∗ 0.8987∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.38) (0.36)
Instruments 18 7 6
Hansen J-test 0.14 0.22 .
Wald Stat 4.14 7.90 8.97
Bootstrap p-value 0.10 0.08 0.04
Threshold was estimated such that each regime has 15% of the observations.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
gap slope now significant and having a larger magnitude than the domestic output gap slope.
Based on this result, we can determine that the foreign output gap replaces the domestic
output gap as the key determinant of inflation in the more open regime. Note that Table 10
also shows that this trend is consistent across the different instrument sets. In particular,
with only the last inflation lag as an instrument, the model is just identified and so this
shift in inflation dynamics is even robust to the particular weighting matrix employed in the
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GMM estimation. Overall, these are strong findings in support of the view that external
factors matter in the inflation process once a sufficient level of openness is reached.
We next look at the usefulness of our panel threshold estimates of trade openness and
in particular the lower bound of the estimated CI, in determining if a given country is
integrated with the global economy. In Ahmad and Civelli (2015), the median threshold
for the countries, that had a significant non-linear effect on inflation from openness, was
found to be about 45%, which is relatively similar to the panel threshold estimate of 51%.
Figure 3 plots the country-specific thresholds from Ahmad and Civelli (2015), and we see
that most of them fall within the 90% CI of the trade openness threshold found from the
panel estimations. These individual threshold estimations were done on quarterly data for
the sample period 1985-2006 using a backward-looking open-economy Phillips Curve model.
This is encouraging as it provides support for the panel threshold analysis and suggests that
the [35− 57] range for trade openness can be used by countries as a guide to determine if
they should start to concentrate on external forces when formulating inflation policies.
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Figure 3: Individual and Panel Threshold Estimates of the OECD countries (1970-2013)
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4.5 Conclusion
There are strong implications for monetary policy if inflation is indeed influenced more by
global conditions, rather than domestic ones. For one, a diminishing response to domestic
factors makes it more costly to stabilize inflation through standard policy actions (Calza,
2009). Alternatively, policy makers may feel that increased competition due globalization
adequately anchors inflationary tendencies, and so are able to concentrate more on increasing
domestic output levels (López-Villavicencio and Saglio, 2014). Given these important policy
consequences, it is imperative to identify the exact role globalization plays in the inflation
process.
Our paper makes a significant contribution by finding strong evidence in favor of including
the global slack as a determinant in a country’s domestic inflation process. We first show
that cross-sectional variation in openness can be effectively used in a dynamic panel Phillips
Curve model to identify the impact of foreign influence, represented by the foreign output
gap, on domestic inflation levels. In contrast to previous empirical literature that looks
at this relationship at the individual-country level, the larger cross-sectional differences in
openness provide more suitable conditions to detect the potential effects of globalization.
This result is also robust to the instrument proliferation and weak instrument problems that
are often associated with the dynamic panel GMM methodology.
We then extend our modeling framework so that openness can have a non-linear role in
the inflation process. Applying the dynamic panel threshold methodology, given in Kremer
et al. (2013), we show that trade openness is an appropriate threshold variable and leads to
an economically meaningful change in a country’s inflation dynamics. Our estimates of the
panel threshold model are also consistent with the inflation globalization hypothesis, with
the foreign output gap replacing the domestic output gap as the driver of domestic inflation
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in the more open regime. So our threshold approach also provides a suitable tool to inform
the policy making process with respect to the influence of relevant external forces.
In our analysis, we have utilized a country’s level of trade openness to capture its degree
of integration in the global markets. However, globalization is a complex phenomenon that
can be measured across various economic, social and political dimensions (Dreher et al.,
2008). It would be interesting to examine if other economic measures of globalization such
as integration in financial markets and labor mobility can also have non-linear effects on the
inflation process. A further possibility is to treat this non-linearity as a Markov-Switching
Process (Hamilton, 1989), which can then be incorporated in a DSGE model (Farmer et al.,
2009) to better understand the structural underpinnings of this relationship. For as we
have shown, non-linearity needs to be explicitly modeled and included in the analysis of the
inflation globalization hypothesis.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Dataset
In our panel data we analyze the following twenty eight OECD countries: U.S., U.K., Ger-
many, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Canada,
Mexico, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Turkey, Hungary, Israel and New Zealand. In addition to these
countries, an additional seventy countries were also included for the construction of the trade
weights.28 We next provide details of this dataset and the construction of the trade-weights.
The main sources are the OECD database (STAT), the IMF’s Direction of Trade (DOT)
and International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Penn World Table Version 8.0 (PWT).
Trade Flows: DOT provides the pairwise trade flows among all the countries in our sample
universe. The flows are measured in current U.S. dollars for all countries. DOT treats
Belgium and Luxembourg as separate countries only after 1997 and Germany is defined as
West Germany alone before the 1991 reunification. Uruguay is excluded due to missing
observations.
Trade Openness: Exports, Imports and GDP (all in nominal terms) are obtained from STAT
to calculate this measure for the countries in our sample. Due to missing observations, PWT
(openc) was used for Hungary, Israel, Luxembourg and Mexico.
Real GDP: STAT and PWT are used to get the real output values. To improve data quality,
we use historical data from Maddison (1995) for Yugoslavia, USSR, and Czechoslovakia. The
output gap is then constructed as gapi,t = gdpi,tpoti,t -1 where the Potential GDP is obtained from
28These countries were chosen based on their economic size.
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using an HP filter on the real GDP series. This measure for the output gap is similar to
the one used by the OECD’s Economic Outlook. To avoid end-of-sample issues with the HP
filter, the Real GDP for each country was forecasted five years ahead using an AR(2) model.
Nominal Exchange Rates: We use the U.S. dollar as pivotal currency for the bilateral ex-
change rates between the U.S. and the other countries in the sample; this allows the creation
of a pair-wise dataset for each country.
Trade weights for imports, exports and third party (wm, wxand wp) are determined as:
wmi,j,t =
Mi,j,t∑Nt
j=1Mi,j,t
(4)
wxi,j,t =
EX i,j,t∑Nt
j=1EXi,j,t
(5)
wpi,j,t =
Nt∑
k Ó=j Ó=i
wxi,k,t
wmk,j,t
1− wmk,i,t
(6)
where Mi,jand EXi,j indicate imports from country j to i and exports from i to j. Weights
are then aggregated as
wi,j,t = 0.5wmi,j,t + 0.5(0.5wxi,j,t + 0.5w
p
i,j,t) (7)
The foreign output gap for country i is then the weighted average, using the weights in (7), of
the domestic output gap for all the other countries in the sample universe. Similarly the real
exchange rate index It for country i, using these same weights, is the geometrically weighted
average of the bilateral exchange rates.
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4.6.2 Bias-corrected Fixed Effects Estimation
In our analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis, we have relied on the Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM methodology to account for the fixed effects term ηi and get consistent
estimates of the dynamic panel model. One reason for this choice, is that in a dynamic
panel framework the traditional Fixed Effects (within mean) estimator is biased for finite
T (Nickell, 1981). However, for large T, it is still consistent, so an alternate approach in
estimating dynamic panel models is to use the Fixed Effects estimator with an approximation
made to correct for the small sample bias. In a Monte Carlo study, Judson and Owen (1999)
have shown that for macro panels, where N is typically small, the bias-corrected Fixed Effects
estimator is more accurate and with a smaller variance than the GMM estimators. Thus in
this section we estimate (2) using annual data (so large T) with the bias-corrected Fixed
Effects estimator and examine whether this impacts our main findings.
Kiviet(1995; 1999) has developed higher-order asymptotic expansion techniques to approx-
imate the small-sample bias of the Fixed Effects estimator up to an accuracy of order T−1,
N−1T−1 and N−1T−2 respectively. In order to calculate the bias terms in practice, a con-
sistent estimator is first needed to get estimates for the lagged term and the residual vari-
ance. Kiviet (1995) suggests using 2SLS, as in Anderson and Hsiao (1981), or GMM, as in
Arellano and Bond (1991), to get these estimates and then plug them in the desired bias-
approximation formula. The bias-corrected Fixed Effects estimates (FEc) are then obtained
by just subtracting these bias approximations from the original Fixed Effects coefficients.
Table 11 reports the panel estimates for the whole sample period (1970-2013) and sub-sample
period (1984-2013) using annual data. We first examine the standard Pooled OLS and Fixed
Effects estimates which show significant coefficients for both the domestic and foreign output
gaps. Since these estimates are biased due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable,
123
we next turn to the bias-corrected Fixed Effects estimates. We use both the AH(Anderson
and Hsiao, 1981) and the AB(Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimators to initialize the bias
correction terms and see similar coefficient estimates for the two output gaps in columns
three and four. The estimated coefficients in these two columns have an approximation
error of order O(N−1T−1). In both cases, the foreign output gap is significant while the
domestic output gap is of smaller magnitude and not significant at the 10% level. As in Bun
and Kiviet (2001), a parametric bootstrap procedure has been applied to get the estimated
standard errors for these bias-corrected Fixed Effects estimators. Overall we continue to
find significance of the foreign output gap in our panel analysis despite relying on a different
empirical methodology, which increases the robustness of our results in Section 4. Finally, a
Mean Group estimator, as proposed in Pesaran and Smith (1995), is also used to allow for
heterogeneous slope coefficients in (2) and we see little change in the significance of these
two output gaps in the inflation process.
Table 11: Fixed Effect Results (Annual Data)
Period: 1970-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE FEc(AH ) FEc(AB) MG
Lag Inf 0.851∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Dom Gap 0.100∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.078 0.084 0.066∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02)
For Gap 0.375∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11)
RMSE 11.52 11.26 17.69 11.50 11.16
∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
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4.6.3 Reducing Instrument Count
A standard way to represent the instrument matrix Zi of (pii,t−1 − pii,t−2) in the GMM esti-
mation of (2) is as:

pii1 0 0 0 ... 0
0 pii2 pii1 0 ... 0
. . . .
. . . .
0 0 0 0 ... pii,T−2

(8)
so Zi corresponds to the (T−2)(T−1)2 moment conditions E[pii,t−s(εit−εi,t−1)] = 0 for t ≥ 3, s ≥
2. We then employ two ways to reduce the number of instruments given in (8).
One approach is to cap the number of instruments per periods by using the previous k lags
only. Then the instrument count becomes linear in T (for example if k = 1 then only the
most recent lag is used as instrument in each time period). We can then express Z li as:

pii1 0 0 0 ... 0
0 pii2 0 0 ... 0
. . pii3 .
. . . .
0 0 0 0 ... pii,T−2

(9)
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Another approach proposed by Roodman (2009) is to collapse the instruments in (8) so that
one column is made for each lag distance (with zeros substituted for missing values).29 A
potential advantage of this approach is that no lags are actually dropped and so are able to
retain more information. Zci is then given as:

pii1 0 0 0 ... 0
pii2 pii1 0 0 ... 0
pii3 pii2 pii1 .
. . . .
pii,T−2 pii,T−1 pii.T−3 0 ... pii1

(10)
Finally these two methods can also be combined to further reduce the number of instruments,
so that collapsing the one lag only instrument set gives us the exact instrument pii,t−2 that
was used in Anderson and Hsiao (1981) :

pii1
pii2
pii3
.
pii.T−2

(11)
29Roodman (2009) showed this imposes the moment condition E[pii,t−s(εit − εi,t−1)] = 0
for each s ≥ 2.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation examines potential nonlinearity in the response of monetary policy makers
as well as between inflation dyanamics and global economic forces. In both cases we have
found that allowing for nonlinear dynamics gives us a more complete picture of the underlying
economic process.
Our results show that there is significant nonlinearity in the Fed’s response reflecting asym-
metric preferences toward both the output gap and inflation. Notably the responses in some
of these regimes do not fall under a Taylor rule, suggesting that while the Fed prefers a
systematic approach to monetary policy it also employs considerable discretion in trying to
achieve key policy objectives. Our model is also able to provide insight on the Fed’s response
during the most recent financial crisis.
In the analysis of the inflation globalization hypothesis, we find evidence that trade openness
is not rejected as threshold variable for the Phillips Curve model for most of the countries
in our sample, and this non-linear component must be explicitly modeled. We find that
as countries reach a certain level of openness, their domestic inflation starts to respond to
external influences as captured by the foreign output gap. Accounting for non-linearities
in the Phillips Curve reveals new evidence that contrary to the previous literature, which
often ignores these effects, helps to corroborate the inflation globalization hypothesis. These
results also hold in the panel threshold framework, with the foreign output gap replacing the
domestic output gap as the driver of domestic inflation in the more open regime.
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